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ABSTRACT
Since the fall of Mohammed Reza Shah in 1979, the Islamic
Republic of Iran has remained politically isolated from the
United States and the West. After eight years of brutal war
with Iraq, Iran has embarked on an effort to rebuild its
devastated military. A major element of its military
reconstruction has been the acquisition of advanced weapon
systems with strategic applications, such as long-range
bombers, submarines, advanced underwater mines, and ballistic
missiles. Iran is also suspected of pursuing the development
and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. Given Iran's
latent hostility towards the United States and its past
willingness to engage in terrorism, these activities are a
most serious concern. This thesis will examine Iran's
strategic motivations, beliefs, intentions, and capabilities,
as well as the potential impact of these capabilities on U.S.
interests in the Persian Gulf. It will also examine a range of
U.S. policy options in response to Iran's pursuit of strategic
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EXECUTIVE SUMiARY
Iran is a state with a xenophobic security perspective.
It sees itself as being historically isolated, and unjustly
denied its rightful role in the regional power structure.
Recent history has served to confirm and reinforce Iran's
sense of isolation and embattlement. The failure of the
international community to condemn Iraqi aggression, and use
of chemical warfare, is seen as evidence cf an international
conspiracy to suppress and destroy Iran. This notion is
confirmed by the U.S. policy of "Dual Containment".
Further exacerbating Iran's xenophobia are its real
national security problems. Iraq retains sufficient military
strength to threaten Iran. Afghanistan and the Central Asian
republics continue to be embroiled in internal conflicts that
threaten to spill across borders and sensitize Iran's
heterogeneous population to volatile ethnic cleavages. The
Arab Gulf states are arming themselves to the teeth. The
enlarged U.S. military presence threatens to permanently
exclude Iran from any security role in the region.
Iran's response to these threats has been conditioned
by the lessons of the Iran-Iraq war and the Gulf war. Iran has
rejected its earlier strategic philosophy which relied on
Islamic fervor and revolutionary zeal in favor of technology
and a trained, professional military force. Special emphasis
has been placed on the acquisition of strategic capabilities
vi
which are believed to deter strategic threats.
Underwater mines, submarines and anti-ship missiles
reflect the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf for Iran.
Ballistic missiles are seen as a necessary deterrent to future
Iraqi aggression and possibly as a deterrent against an
Israeli preemptive strike. Chemical weapons are seen as an
evil necessity in order to deter the future use of such
weapons against Iran. Finally, Iran's growing nuclear
infrastructure indicates that Iran is pursuing, over the long
term, a nuclear weapons capability. The primary objective of
its nuclear weapons program would seem to be deterrence.
Iran's attempts to deter future aggression have only
served to heighten suspicion concerning its intentions. Iran's
revolutionary political ideology is an anathema to the rulers
of the Arab Gulf states. Suspicion has led to a regional arms
race, which exacerbates Iran's security dilemma.
Iran seems to-be seeking a role in the political,
security, and economic structures of the region that is
commensurate with its size, resources and population.
Estimates of the scope and purpose of its conventional
military buildup have been exaggerated. Even its growing
strategic capabilities reflect more of a concern for
deterrence than any inherently aggressive tendencies.
The U.S. policy of Dual Containment assumes that Iran is
an expansionist state that must be contained. Its success
relies on strong support from U.S. allies, which has failed to
vii
materialize. It assumes that the political and military status
quo of the Persian Gulf will remain fundamentally unchanged.
However, there is no evidence that the status quo of such a
volatile region will remain constant. Finally, it depends on
a long-term, high profile, U.S. military presence in the
region, despite reduced defense budgets and manpower
reductions. The net result is the creation of strong
incentives for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons as quickly as
possible.
If the major goal of U.S. policy is long term stability
in the Persian Gulf, then an alternate strategy must be
considered. The critical objective of the policy would be the
creation of a viable regional security organization. The
United States would seek to gradually reduce its security role
in the region. Iran would not be denied the means to provide
for its defense in a reasonable conventional manner. Expansion
of non-military economic ties with Iran would be encouraged.
At the same time, the U.S. position on the issues of
proliferation, subversion, terrorism, and military aggression
would be made absolutely clear. The U.S. would continue to
conduct bi-lateral relations with the states of the region and
remain openly committed to the stability of the region. By
focusing on the mutual U.S.-Iranian interests of regional
security, reduced U.S. military commitment, and the expansion
of economic ties, the United States could unilaterally lay the
foundation for long term regional stability and rapprochement.
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I. ITRODUCTION
Fifteen years after the Islamic Revolution, Iran remains
politically isolated and continues to view the United States
as the "Great Satan", whose regional presence is a direct
threat to the security of the state and the revolution.
Iran's security concerns are manifested in an ambitious
campaign to rebuild its armed forces. In addition to
rebuilding its conventional capailities, Iran is striving to
generate strategic military capabilities." Submarines,
sophisticated underwater mines, anti-ship missiles,
intermediate range ballistic missiles, and advanced attack
aircraft, in addition to chemical, biological and possibly
nuclear weapons will provide Iran with a respectable strategic
force structure that deeply concerns U.S. policy-makers.
Despite its vehement rhetoric, Iran's security policy is not,
however, driven solely by its concerns about the United
States.
Iran's quest for security has its roots in a 2500 year old
national history that has recorded the ravages of foreign
invaders and successive occupations. Historically, Iran's
security concerns have resulted in a foreian policy that seeks
'For the purpose of this thesis strategic military
capabilities will be defined as those capabilities that
allow a state to control the course of a military or
political situation by deterrence of aggression, denial of
victory, and/or enforced compliance..
1 .. ..
to maintain national security by limiting the influence of
great powers in the region, along with the development and
maintenance of military capabilities sufficient to ensure
regional hegemony. In light of Iran's strategic location and
proven animosity towards the West, its pursuit of strategic
capabilities is of justifiable concern. These concerns are
further exacerbated by Washington's uncertainty over Iran's
intentions. Is Iran's drive to rearm based on its concerns
about possible foreign aggression? Or is Iran pursuing
strategic capabilities in support of its stated goal of
expansion of Islamic revolution?
From Tehran's perspective, efforts to modernize and
improve its military capabilities are well justified. Prior to
its defeat in the second Gulf War, Iraq was very close to
developing a nuclear weapons capability. Its chemical weapons
program was already well established. Despite the allied
victory and subsequent embargo, Iraq continues to maintain a
substantial military capability that will certainly increase
when the U.N.-sponsored embargo is lifted. 2
With the waning of the Iraqi threat, Israel has identified
Iran as its most dangerous enemy and has employed its
extensive facilities and influence in an effort to convince
the West of the evil nature of Iran. In the post-war period,
the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have embarked
2For a sumnmary of Iraq's present military capabilities
see The Military Balance 1993-94 , (London: Brassey's Ltd,
1993), p. 117.
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on a massive arms build-up, focused mainly on countering
Iran's emerging military superiority in the region. To the
north and east, Afghanistan and many of the newly independent
states of the former Soviet Union are embroiled in civil war.
These conflicts have burdened Iran with millions of refugees
3
and create speculation about future Russian intervention in
the region. To the southeast, Pakistan and India are now
considered capable of employing nuclear weapons and have
dangerously teetered on the threshold of nuclear conflict over
the Kashmir issue. 4
A special concern for Iran is the widely exi., ded security
role the United States plays in the region. Prior to the
second Gulf war, U.S. presence in the region was relatively
small. The Arab regimes could be counted on to openly oppose
the permanent basing of foreign forces in the region. Since
1991 the U.S. presence has grown significantly, not only in
the Gulf but also in Northern Iraq and Turkey. The U.S. Navy
maintains a carrier battle group in the region which can
easily strike Iran - a point brought strongly home to Tehran
by the 1993 cruise missile attack on the Iraqi intelligence
service headquarters in Baghdad.
3According to the U.N., Iran presently hosts 4.1
million refugees. See "Iran Ranks Unenviable First," Iran
Times, Washington, D.C., 19 November 1993, p. 16.
4See Seymour M. Hersh, "On The Nuclear Edge," The New
Yorkle, 29 March 1993, pp. 56-73.
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Washington's perspective on Iran's military buildup and
Gulf security is much different. Tehran's venomous rhetoric
towards the United States, its regional allies, and Israel, on
the one hand, and Iran's implicit and explicit support of
subversion and terrorism, on the other, provide sufficient
cause for U.S. skepticism regarding Iranian intentions. The
Western press routinely characterizes Iran as a revolutionary
regime which seeks, as its ultimate goal, the destruction of
Western culture. 5 This image is hard to refute when these
arguments are presented in isolation from wider political
issues and based solely on evidence of Iran's involvement in
the support of revolutionary Islamic movements, political
assassinations, and interference in the domestic affairs of
other states.'
These concerns are further complicated by the lack of
direct dialogue between Tehran and Washington. This lack of
communication has forced a capabilities-driven assessment of
6See Dr. Assad Homayoun, "Iran's Administration
Persists In Searching For Jihad While Neglecting Its
Domestic Base," Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic
Plicy, 31 July 1993, p. 8.
'It is interesting to note that the five central issues
over which the United States opposes Iran - proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, conventional proliferation,
suppcrt for terrorism, opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace
process, and subversion of friendly governments - reflect a
good deal of inconsistency on the part of the United States.
If applied as broad criteria for U.S. support, Israel, Saudi
Arabia and many of the United States' other regional allies
would not qualify.
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Iran's intentions.7 Unable to determine Iran's intentions
regarding issues of security and foreign policy through
dialogue, U.S. policy-makers tend to assume a worst-case
scenario based on Iran's specific military capabilities. The
vision of a nuclear-capable, revolutionary, expansionist Iran
dogmatically adhering to the concepts of radical jihad and
martyrdom strikes fear in Western hearts. The policies which
result from this type of analysis create a more threatening
image of the United States in the Iran's eyes.' Consequently,
Iran reacts with increasing belligerence towards U.S. presence
and perceived interference in the region.
Many analysts have concluded that Iran's desire to acquire
strategic military capabilities is based on its belief that
these capabilities will provide it the requisite freedom of
action to intimidate U.S. allies, deter or diminish U.S.
regional influence and engage in the expansion of its
revolutionary role.' The present U.S. Middle East policy of
"dual containment" is based on this reasoning." Despite its
'For an example of a capabilities-driven analysis see
Michael Eisenstadt, "Deja Vu All Over Again? An Assessment
of Iran's Military Buildup," Iran's Strategic Intentions and
Capabilities, ed., Patrick Clawson, (Washington, D.C.:
National Defense University, 1994), pp. 93-151.
'For an explanation of present U.S. policy towards Iran
see Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2, March/April 1994, pp. 45-55.
'Eisenstadt, pp. 94-95.
"
10The policy of "dual containment" was first outlined
by Martin Indyk, Special Assistant to the National Security
(continued...)
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political appeal, careful study reveals the fallacies upon
which this policy is based. Shahram Chubin, a respected
analyst of Iranian security policy, has eloquently expressed
the weakness of this form of policy formulation.
The labelling of some as "rogue" or "backlash" states,
the tendency to infer intentions from capabilities, to
exaggerate those capabilities, and to assume a
similarity in states assigned to this category, often
leads to an expectation of uniform behavior...
Oversimplification of problems that are multi-
dimensional will lead to poor policy. •
Although Iran's support of revolutionary movements and
terrorism appears undeniable1 2, the problem lies in the
assumption that Iran's motivations for engagement in these
activities are primarily revolutionary and ideological, with
no foundation or roots in traditional Iranian national
interests." While revolutionary ideology has at times seemed
O... continued)
Council for the Middle East Policy, in a special report to
the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 21 May 1993.
"
1Shahram Chubin, "Iran's Strategic Aims and
Constraints," Iran's Strategic Intentions and Capabilities,
ed., Patrick Clawson, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense
University, 1994), p. 66.
"12The 1983 bombings of the Marine Barracks and the
American Embassy in Beirut are just two examples of Iran's
sponsorship of terrorism. Additionally, the State Department
has identified Iran as a state that sponsors terrorism. For
an analysis of Iran's recent campaign of political
assassination see Thomas Sancton, "Terrorism, The Tehran
Connection," Tj=i, 21 March 1994, pp. 51-55.
"13Dr. Assad Homayoun, p. 9.
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to lead Iran down a politically confrontational path, these
instances have been few (the Salmon Rushdie affair seems to be
the most obvious case), and have not seriously damaged Iran's
interests over the long term. Despite the outcry from the
West, the Rushdie affair has served Iran's national interest
within the Islamic and Third World and has not seriously
damaged its ability to conduct vital economic transactions
with the West. The ideo±.Eical contradictions of Iranian
foreign policy suggest that its formulation is a very
pragmatic and realistic process.
As the only "legitimate" Islamic Republic,2 4 Iran holds
a unique position of leverage in relation to its regional
rivals. It applies its leverage by pointing out the Islamic
illegitimacy of regimes that it fears or wishes to influence.
Iran's application of this political-religious leverage is
very selective and is by no means ideologically driven. This
fact is illustrated by the dichotomies within Iran's foreign
policy. Iran pursues close relations with secular,
authoritarian Syria and criticizes similar, perhaps more
tolerant regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria. Iran supports
monarchial rule in Oman, the Emirates, and Qatar, while it
denounces the monarchy in Saudi Arabia, which is arguably a
more devoutly Islamic state than Iran itself. Iran's rivalry
"Within the Muslim world , the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan is widely viewed to be the creation of the
reactionary regime of General Zia Al-Haq, and does not
enjoy the prestige accorded to Iran for its revolutionary
struggle.
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with Saudi Arabia reveals the purely nationalist goals of
Iranian foreign policy and the negative effects true expansion
of the Islamic Revolution would have on Iran.
Iran would stand to gain very little from expansion of the
Islamic Revolution. In the event that revolutionary Islam were
to succeed, the cleavages created by the Shi'a - Sunni split,
and the historical animosity between the Arabs and Persians
would likely deny Iran the prestige it now holds. Worse, such
a revolution would deprive Iran of its most powerful tool of
leverage in regional politics - sole possession of Islamic
legitimacy. It is unlikely that an Islamic Republic in Egypt
would become a staunch ally of Iran.
If Iran is not pursuing a revolutionary agenda, why does
it seemingly pursue regional autonomy? A careful analysis of
the determinants of Iran's security perspective and its threat
perceptions may reveal that its present security policy is
based more on a historical quest for national security and
traditional fear of foreign domination and less on ideological
and revolutionary factors. The importance of determining the
actual reasons for Iran's rearmament program cannot be over-
emphasized. U.S. policy must be based on a sound understanding
of Iran's motivations. Policies based on the assumption that
a Iran is an aggressor might produce unexpected and perhaps
undesired results if in fact it is not an aggressor state.
A. HYPOTHES-S
Answering the question of why a nation would choose to
pursue the acquisition of strategic military capabilities is
no simple task. The proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs) has recently become a priority
international concern. To this end theories of proliferation
are being actively pursued."5 It is my hypothesis that Iran's
pursuit of strategic capabilities is the result of a security
dilemma. This security dilemma rises out of the mutual
misperception and distrust that exists between Iran and its
international and regional rivals. These misperceptions are
rooted in the dichotomy created by Iran's pursuit of
traditional strategic objectives and western interpretation of
the Islamic Republic's rhetoric and actions as indicative of
its pursuit of revolutionary goals.
This thesis will focus on thiee basic issues: Iran's
security perspective, its perception of threat, and reaction
to these perceived threats. I will explain why Iran seems to
be a state which suffers from xenophobia regarding its
national security, followed by an analysis of Iran's present
threat perceptions. I will then argue that Iran's pursuit of
specific strategic capabilities results from its failure to
break out of its security dilemma through diplomacy and
"For a discussion of the prominent theories of
proliferation see Peter Lavoy, "Nuclear Myths and the Causes
of Nuclear Proliferation," Strategic Studies, Numbers 3/4,
Volume 2, Spring/Summer 1993.
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alliance formation and its inability to balance internally by
conventional means. In conclusion I will discuss the
implications of Iran's security policy for the United States
and attempt to apply the insights gained to a range of U.S.
policy options concerning Iran.
10
11. TZORWETICAL PRA.MEWORR
A. NMORNM.ISM AND TEE SECURITY DILMDU
How does a state ensure its own security without
threatening the security of other states? This is the basic
question underpinning the security dilemma. The security
dilemma was perhaps first recognized by Thucydides. Describing
the cause of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides states:
The real cause (of the war) I consider to be the one
which was formally most kept out of sight. The growth
of power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired
in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable.'
Thus Athens' efforts to increase its security led it into war
with Lacedaemon, which feared Athenian power.
Kenneth Waltz defines the security dilemma as a natural
result within an anarchic international system:
Even if every state were stable, the world of states
might not be. If each state, being stable, strove only
for security and had no designs on its neighbors, all
states would nevertheless remain insecure; for the
means of security for one state are, in their very
1Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, John H.
Finley, Jr., transi. (New York: Modern Library, 1951), Ch.
1, p. 24.
11
existence, the means by which other states are
threatened.2
Waltz's theory of international relations, Neorealism,
breathed new life into the realist school of international
relations theory. Neorealism is a modification of Hans
Morgenthau's concept of realism, which contends that states
seek to maximize power in an anarchic international system.'
waltz recognized many of the flaws of traditional realist
thought and modified the theory based on the premise that
states do not necessarily seek to. maximize power but only
strive to achieve relative power. In other words, each state,
acting rationally, does not necessarily attempt to become a
world or regional hegemon. Instead, a state seeks that level
of power required to balance the threat from other states.
From this concept is born Waltz's theory of the balance of
power and alliance formation.
Waltz emphasizes the systemic approach to analysis. It is
the international political system that constrains states and
leads them to behave in a predictable manner. Waltz admits
that unit-level factors may also constrain a state's foreign
policy but asserts that if these unit-level factors cause a
2Kenneth N. Waltz,"Reductionist and Systemic Theories,"
Theory of International Relations, reprinted in IQeism
and Its Critics, ed., Robert 0. Keohane, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1986), p. 51.
3Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (New York:
Knopf, 1967), p. 5.
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state to pursue policies harmful to its national interests,
either these policies will be altered or the state's power
will inevitably decline.
Neorealism explains the behavior of states when confronted
by external threats does not provide a clear understanding of
the spectrum of factors which influence a state's foreign
policy, and consequently many of the important factors
involved in the concept of the security dilemma.' It does not
consider the role of misperception of threat in the security
dilemma.
B. THREAT PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN THE SECURITY DILEMMA
A critical element of the security dilemma is a state's
misperceptions concerning other states' intentions. These
misperceptions arise from a number of factors including
historical animosities, and ideological and cultural
cleavages. Robert Jervis emphasizes the impact of a state's
geopolitical situation and the significance of perception of
threat as important elements of the security dilemma. He
argues that there are basically two factors that create
misperception of intent within the security dilemma. The first
being the difference of opinion about the levels of security
required by a state.
4Waltz does not intend his theory to be a tool for the
analysis of a state's policy development process. It is
simply a tool for predicting the long term behavior of
states within the international system.
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The more states value their security above all else
the more they are likely to be sensitive to even
minimal threats, and to demand high levels of arms.S
The second aspect focuses on a state's strategic
predisposition towards other states.
The second aspect of subjective security is the
perception of threat (that is, the estimate of whether
the other will cooperate). A state that is predisposed
to see either a specific state as an adversary, or
others in general, as a menace, will react more
strongly and more quickly than a state that sees its
environment as benign. Indeed, when a state believes
that another not only is not likely to be an
adversary, but has sufficient interests in common with
it to be an ally, then it will actually welcome an
increase in the other's power.'
These factors help explain a state's reaction to its
perception of threat but do not explain why a particular state
might tend to react more strongly to even minimal threats than
other states, or why a state would perceive other states to be
predisposed adversaries. Does the misperception that drives
the security dilemma result simply from a worst case
assumption of intent based on analysis of the military
capabilities of a state without regard to that state's
historical behavior and relations- with other states? The
realist school of international relations would argue that
'Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under The Security




this is the only prudent course, since intentions are at best
vague and subject to change over time.
In 1933, although the British army was willing to
assume war with France was out of the question, the
air force and the navy were not. Maurice Hankey, the
influential secretary of the Committee of Imperial
Defence, agreed with them: his subordinate noted that
"Hankey's opinion is that we cannot neglect France
completely - times change and policies with them;
there are plenty of examples of that in the past, and
the changes can be rapid." The year before the United
States staged a war game in the Pacific Ocean in which
the envisaged enemy was an Anglo-Japanese coalition.
In the 1920's Canada's only war plan held that the
principal external threat to the security of Canada
lay in the possibility of armed invasion by the force
of the United States.'
Despite the humorous implications of these displays of extreme
"realism'" in military planning, assumption of intent based on
analysis of military power is not the chief source of
misperception between states.
Stephen M. Walt addresses the sources of threat in his
book The Origins of Alliances.0 Walt asserts that threat
perceptions are not based simply on a state's power but on the
nature of a state's power. Specifically, whether a state's
power is threatening or not. According to Walt, the four
7Jervis, Perception and MisDerceDtion in International
Politc, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p.
62.
$Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances,(Ithaca,
NY.: Cornell University Press, 1987).
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factors which create a threatening power are aggregate power,
proximity, offensive capability, and offensive intentions.'
Walt's theory clearly recognizes the importance of
geographic location in addition to aggregate military power.
Despite this improvement on Jervis' explanation, Walt
struggles to determine how a state perceives "offensive
intentions" on the part of another state. He notes that "birds
of a feather" (ideologically or culturally similar states) may
flock together for the purpose of alliance formation but
suggests that ideology is, at best, a subordinate factor in
the assessment of threat.1 0 Walt suggests that the effect of
ideology o.i threat perception is exaggerated by the tendency
of states to assign too much importance to the political
rhetoric of foreign leaders.1
Despite Walt's skepticism, the fact remains that
historical ideological and cultural cleavages are inextricably
linked to the issue of misperception. Without recognizing the
significance of these factors in the perception of "offense
intentions", Walt would be bard pressed to explain why Canada
does not view the aggregate power, proximity, and offensive
'Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance
of World Power," International Security, Spring 1985 ,Vol.






capability of the United States as a realistic threat. 12 Or
more appropriately, why Iran views Iraq's nuclear program
with so much more concern than the nuclear program of
Pakistan. In an attempt to analyze a state's intentions,
decision-makers are unable to ignore the geopolitical,
historical, ideologi.cal and cultural factors involved. The
significance of these factors seems to be at least as
important as issues of military capability.
C. SECURITY PERSPECTIVES
It is apparent that in addition to the analysis of
intention based on military capabilities, an equally important
source of misperception is the divergence of security
perspectives between states caught in the security dilemma. In
order to explain a state's behavior within a security dilemma,
one must answer two questions. How does a state define its
security? And what strategies does it employ to gain security?
The answers are linked to the state's security perspective.
A state's security perspective may be defined as its view
of its position in relation to neighboring states, great
powers and alliances and how these international actors affect
the pursuit of its strategic objectives. When a state believes
that its strategic objectives are strongly opposed by other
12In its early history the United States even exhibited
a fair amount of offensive intent towards its neighbors. The
United States did invade Canada twice and failed both times.
The United States also annexed as much of Mexico as it
thought was worth taking.
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states it will likely adopt a xenophobic security perspective.
The strategies that emerge from a xenophobic state will likely
appear aggressive and threatening despite the defensive
intentions of the state. Understanding the specific causes of
the security dilenma requires an understanding of the
development of a state's security perspective - the events and
factors that have influenced its strategic view. Iran appears
to be a classic case of the xenophobic state - a state that
views its environment as generally hostile and seemingly over-
reacts to its perceived threats.
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Ill. DTETERXKNTS OF IRAN'S SECURITY PERSPECTIVE
President Clinton's National Security Advisor, Anthony
Lake has described Iran's security perspective as being
equivalent to a "siege mentality"'. He argues that Iran's
xenophobia results from the isolation the international
community has imposed upon it for its failure to conform to
recognized standards of conduct. While Mr. Lake may be correct
in his description of Iran's security perspeict.ive as
"xenophobic", his analysis of its cause is only partially
correct.. Iran's security perspective; its view of its
strategic position relative to other international and
regional actors, has long appeared "xenophobic" and is not
entirely the result of the political events of the last 15
years.2
Is Iran really "xenophobic"? Or are its reactions to
perceived threats well justified? Explanations of Iran's
security perspective that ignore the influence of geography,
history, ideology, and culture are not well founded and do not
provide a sound basis for the development of policy.
'Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2, March/April 1994, p. 46.
2Iran's security policy under Mohammed Reza Shah was
far more ambitious and aggressive than that of the present
regime. The Shah sought to make Iran the dominant power in
not only the Persian Gulf, but also in the Indian Ocean. See
Shahram Chubin,"Iran's Security in the 1980s," International
Scrt, Vol. 2, No. 3, Winter 1978, pp. 50-80.
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Although the entire policy of a state does not
derive from its geography, it cannot escape that
geography. It can deal with the challenges of its
geographic predicament skillfully or ineptly; it can
modify the challenges; but it cannot ignore them. For
geography does not argue. It simply is. 3
The Persian phrase Iran-zamin literally means the land of
Iran but figuratively refers to a region that extends beyond
the boundaries of the present day state of Iran. Iran-zamin
represents the greater region of similar culture and heritage,
linked linguistically and historically to the Aryans and
Medes. This area is generally recognized to extend as far west
as the mountains east of the Tigris-Euphrates river valley and
as far North as the Caucasus, and steppes of Central Asia. To
the southeast it is bordered by Pakistan, and southern
Afghanistan, while extending all the way to Tajikistan in the
northeast. In reality these boundaries are vague, as contained
within them are significant numbers of non-Persian peoples.
Only along the Gulf coast is the boundary relatively finite,
although it could be extended to some of the islands of the
Gulf that continue to be largely influenced by Persian
culture.
3Nicholas Spykman, The GeograDhv of Peace, (New York:


















Source: World Atlas, The Software Toolworks, Chatsworth,
CA., 1990.
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Today, the state of Iran occupies the heartland of Iran-zamin,
encompassing the geographic center of Persian culture,
language and religion.'
The modern state of Iran is an extremely mountainous and
arid country. The mountain ranges represent formidable
barriers to transportation and naturally divide the different
high plains or steppes. This rugged topography is responsible
for the general isolation of Iran from the north, west and
southwest.
Persia is exceedingly difficult to enter from the
Persian Gulf on the south, the Bushire-Shiraz route
being one of the very worst in the world. It is also
difficult of approach from the Caspian Sea on the
north, from Arabistan on the west and from Baluchistan
on the east. Indeed, few countries are by nature more
isolated.'
The ruggedness of the terrain combined with the shortage
of water has ensured the wide dispersion of population
centers. The majority of the rivers and streams that have
their source in the Alborz and Zagros mountains drain into the
interior desert. This fact has led to the establishment of
population centers along the inside of the V created by the
Alborz and Zagros mountain ranges. Within this V, Persians
settled along the high rims of compartmentalized valleys. The
4John W. Limbert. Iran. At War with History, (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1987), p. 1.
5Sir Percy Sykes, A History of-Persia. Volume I, (New
York: Barnes and Noble, 1969), p. 28.
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isolation of their existence demanded a high level of self-
sufficiency, which in turn, contributed to "historical
continuity, preservation of racial stocks and comparative
safety and independeace in periods of foreign invasion."'
The isolation created by rugged topography has
significantly aided the preservation of Persian culture.
Paradoxically geography also weakens Iran's position in
relation to invading armies. The great central plain of Iran
is an uninhabitable wasteland, and as such does not provide
strategic depth in the event of invasion. Mohammed Reza Shah
accurately described Iran's lack of strategic depth:
The weakness of our position is that the center of
Iran is a vast plateau, on a northwest-southeast axis,
with steppes and salt deserts. The plateau is
surrounded on all sides by chains of mountains: the
Elburz mountains more or less cover the northern
frontier, the Zagros mountains lie to the west and the
Baluchistan mountains to the southeast. With the
exception of a few large towns (Isphahan, Kerman) the
center of our country is empty and barren, and the
population, activity, wealth and culture are
concentrated in the surrounding provinces.'
The strategic significance of the desert was not lost on Sir
Percy Sykes.
6Donald N. Wilber, Iran: Past and Present, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 10.
7Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Answer To History, (New York:
Stein and Day, 1980), p. 35.
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This huge desert has left a deep mark on its
inhabitants. Separating north from south and east from
west more effectively than high ranges of snow-clad
mountains or a gulf of equal size..., and it has
influenced the habits, the outlook, and even the
physique of the Persian; for it lies close to his
cities, to Tehran and Mashad on the north, to Qum and
Kashan on the west, to Yazd and Kerman on the south,
and to Kain and Birjand on the east. In short, the
desert is the "Dead Heart of Persia"l.8
As a result of the uninhabitable interior, the population
centers are concentrated along the terrain features that form
the frontier and provide the natural defensive barriers for
the country. This has exposed the majority population of Iran
to the ravages of war and invasion and sensitized Iranians to
their nation's lack of strategic depth.
Ironically, the lack of strategic depth which hinders
Iran's security also makes it difficult for conquerors to
rule. The great central desert is a major obstacle to the
consolidation of power, requiring a conqueror to garrison the
entire country at great cost and effort. For this reason the
invaders of Iran have historically sought to coopt regionally
based Iranian support. Traditional regional tribal leaders
would be retained to act as the agent of the new central
government. This is another reason for the persistence of
Persian culture.
The geopolitical centrality of Iran serves to further
complicate Iran's geographic dilemma.
OSir Percy Sykes, p. 20.
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Situated in that part of the Middle East which was the
cradle of the great Western civilizations, we find
ourselves at the crossroads which unite Europe and
Asia, the Indian sub-continent and Africa. Our shores
are washed by three seas - the Caspian to the north,
the Persian Gulf to the southwest and the Gulf of Oman
to the south - and we are only separated by Syria and
Iraq from the Mediterranean, which was for centuries
the center of the civilized world. This is the
stren'gth of our position. It allowed us, during the
great moments of our history, to conquer, trade with,
influence and civilize neighboring countries. 9
Unfortunately for Iran, the strength of its position has
also led others to covet it or at least covet the routes of
access it provides. Iran at its strongest moments during the
Archaemenian and Sassanid dynasties, was still confronted with
the challenge of great powers in the west and warlike nomads
of the Asian steppes, and expended great effort and resource
defending against them. At weaker moments, Iran found itself
under the domination of foreign forces that sought access to
India, China, Mesopotamia, and the Persian Gulf.
In the past, foreign irredentist ambitions focused on
monopolizing the lucrative silk and spice trade routes to
India, China and the Persian Gulf. Today Iran's predicament is
no different except that oil is the commodity of international
interest. In this regard geography further weakens Iran's
security. The majority of Iran's oil wealth is located in the
'Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, p.35.
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province'of Khuzestan'0 . Khuzestan, due to its location west
of the Zagros mountains in the Tigris-Euphrates river valley,
does not enjoy the natural isolation of the rest of Iran. Its
vulnerability underlines the strategic importance of the
Persian Gulf for Iran.
The Persian Gulf provides Iran with its only viable outlet
for international trade. While overland routes are susceptible
to interference by neighboring states, the Persian Gulf
provides direct access to international waters and the world.
Since Iran's major commercial ports and oil terminals are
located well inside the Persian Gulf at Kharq Island and
Khoramshahr, the Straits of Hormuz are a strategic chokepoint
to Iran. Due to the narrowness of the Straits, they could be
denied by a relatively insignificant force. Security of its
interests in the Gulf - ensuring access to the Indian Ocean
and to international trade - is one of Iran's highest
priorities. As Iran's foreign minister noted in 1993:
Our most important and strategic border is our
southern coastline, the Gulf, the Straits of Hormuz
and the Sea of Oman. This region is vital to us.. .We
cannot remain indifferent to its fate."
"l°Shireen Hunter, "Gulf Security: An Iranian
Perspective", The Gulf and International Security, ed., M.E.
Ahrari, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), p. 35.
"
1 Ali Akbar Velayati, Iran's Foreign Minister, quoted
in Mohammed Ziarati, "Iranian National Security," Middle
East International, 3 April 1993, p.. 18.
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Without the international access the Gulf provides, Iran would
be at the mercy of its neighbors for access to international
markets and commerce. For precisely this reason, the presence
of foreign naval forces in the Gulf is extremely threatening
for Iran.
Certain facets of geography such as size, demography,
topography, natural resources, and central geopolitical
location have enhanced and preserved Iran's culture and the
independence of its people, in turn reinforcing its sense of
regional pre-eminence or "manifest destiny". Other features of
geography have served to isolate Iran and sensitize it to the
vulnerabilities of its position. The combined result of these
factors have contributed to Iran's xenophobia and its ardent
nationalism, two factors which push it toward a more
aggressive foreign policy.
B. HISTORY
I saw countless kinds of people with all varieties
of different languages and customs and habits and
rites and religions who came in one gate and went out
another and how often not a single creature had been
left alive nor any structure left unrazed. Arabs and
non-Arabs, Turks, and Tajiks and Turcomans, Mongols
and Afghans, strangers and kinsmen, all came parading
through and vanished like phantoms in a dream. The
city's history and geography mixed inextricably like
fact and metaphor and left my helpless eyes incapable
of distinguishing history from legend and truth from
falsehood .... Our city passed from hand to hand like a
polo ball and its peoples suffered agonies and burned
in flames. Then as they recovered, the Mongols'
unspeakable and conscienceless violence and injustice
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descended upon them and their possessions, like a
heavenly fire of wrath and rage.
Perhaps due to its longevity as a nation, Iran's security
perspective is especially affected by history. The history of
Iran spans an incredibly long period; 2500 years. During this
time Iran rose to great heights of power and fell under
foreign domination numerous times. This cycle of ascension,
expansion, decline, and subservience has been indelibly
imprinted on the collective memory of Iran.
Iran traces its national origin to the rise of Cyrus II,
the Great, the leader who unified Persia, established the
Archaemenian dynasty (559-330B.C.), and conquered much of the
then-known world. At the peak of power, the Archaemenians'
domain extended from "the Black Sea to Central Asia and from
India to Libya"1 3
The Archaemenian dynasty found its rival in the form of
the Greek city states. 7or two centuries, Persian kings
cleverly exploited rivalry between the Greeks, thus ensuring
Persia's security. The rise of Philip of Macedon, and the
unification of the Greek city states under his son, Alexander,
marked the decline of the Archaemenian dynasty. The Greek
challenge was met at the battle of Issus, where a huge Persian
army confronted Alexander's forces. Despite an impressive
S2Graham E. Fuller, The Center Of The Universe: The
GeoDolitics of Iran, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p.18.
"13Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, p. 36.
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numerical advantage, lack of leadership and cowardice by the
Persian king, Darius III, proved disastrous.' 4  The
Archaemenian dynasty fell to Alexander the Great's legions in
330 B.C.. The glorious Persian capital, Persepolis, was burned
and for the first time Iran experienced the indignity of
foreign occupation and domination.'s Since the fall of the
Archaemenians, Iran has struggled to regain the glory of that
distant ige.
Beginning in 224 A.D. the Persian empire experienced a
renaissance under the Sassanid dynasty. Under the brilliant
leadership of Shahpur I, the Persian empire expanded and
almost attained the glory of the Archaemenians. Despite these
successes, the entire period of Sassanid rule was marked by a
continuous and bitter struggle with the Roman and later the
Byzantine empire in the west and constant pressure from the
warlike nomads that inhabited the Central Asian steppes in the
east. These struggles eventually weakened the Sassanids and
left Persia vulnerable to invasion once again.
In 63.7 A.D. Arab forces met and defeated a Sassanid army
at the battle of Qaddasiya. By 642 A.D. the Arab conquest of
Persia was complete. From 642 A.D. until 1500 A.D. Iran was
ruled, more or less, by foreign conquerors. The Arabs (642-
1055 A.D.), Seljuk Turks (1055-1258 A.D.), the Mongols (1258-
"For a detailed account of Alexander's campaign
against the Persians see Percy Sykes, pp. 244-263.
15Donald N. Wilber, p. 30.
30
1385 A.D.), and the Timurids (1385-1500 A.D.), in succession,
occupied -Iran. Some proved more brutal than others, but, these
conquests generally wrought tragedy and suffering of untold
proportion upon the Persians. The cruelties imposed by the
Mongols are legendary and almost unbelievable to this day.
1500 A.D. marked the beginning of the second renaissance
of the Persian empire and it is from this date that the
history of the modern state of Iran begins1 6 . In this year,
a descendent of the Prophet Mohammed's son-in-law, and the
Fourth Caliph, Ali Ibn Abu Talib, defeated the last of
Tamerlane's successors and re-established Persian rule. He
took the title Isma'il Shah.
In order to solidify national unity against the Sunni
Ottoman empire and further justify his religious claim to the
throne, he declared the Shi'a sect of Islam to be the national
religion, thus canonizing the relationship between Shi'a Islam
and Iranian nationalism. The Saffavid dynasty, as it was
known, reached its zenith under Shah 'Abbas (1572-1629)and
prospered until the early portion of the eighteenth century,
when it collapsed under an invasion by the Afghans.
The Afghans were quickly iouted by the first of a new
breed of Middle Eastern leader. Setting the example for the
likes of Mohammed Ali, Mustapha Kemal, and Reza Shah, Nadir
16Interestingly, Iran's renaissance coincided with the
emergence of the era of the nation-state. The Ottomans were
heavily engaged with the West and the Central Asiatics were
in a moribund state. This provided a window of opportunity
for Iranian resurgence.
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Shah rose from within the ranks of the army. By 1736 he had
evicted the Afghans and by 1737 had invaded and conquered much
of India; returning to his capital at Mashad with the Indian
treasury and famed Peacock Throne. His demise at the hands of
his own bodyguards ended the last period of great Iranian
power.
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Iran's
geostrategic importance was delineated in terms of continuing
struggles between Russia to the north and western powers over
influence and control of the region. Iran was thrust into the
"Great Game"; the imperial struggle between Great Britain and
Russia over control of South Asia. Iran's experience with
Russia during this period was particularly humiliating. The
Russo-Iranian war (1804-1828) resulted in major territorial
and economic concessions by Iran.
Great Britain's concern about Russian expansion towards
India led to British interference in the south and in
Afghanistan. A Russian-sponsored Iranian expedition to reclaim
the city of Herat from Afghanistan was thwarted by the British
military. Over time Iran was effectively divided between
Russia and Great Britain. The advent of British-Russian
entente in the beginning of the twentieth century led to the
official partition of Iran into "spheres of influence" under
the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907.1'
"17Joseph A. Kechichian, "National Security," Iran, A
Country Study, ed., Helen Chapin Metz, (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 238.
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The decision of the British navy in 1913 to switch from
coal to oil-fired boilers had a great impact on the
sovereignty of Iran. Winston Churchill, then serving as First
Lord of the Admiralty, articulated the basis for Britain's
foreign policy in the Persian Gulf:
Our ultimate policy is that the Admiralty should
become the independent owner and producer of its own
supplies of liquid fuel .... We must become the owners,
or at any rate the controllers at the source , of at
least a portion of the supply of the natural oil which
we require. 1
As a result Iran became a regional base for the British
Empire in the Persian Gulf, with Sir Percy Cox, the British
Agent residing in Bushire throughout World War I.
The rise of Reza Shah forced the British to tie their
regional policy to the support of the Arab Gulf states.
Britain moved to limit Iran's influence in the region. When
Iran sought sovereignty over Bahrain, Britain's support of the
Al-Khalifa family resulted in Iran's loss of influence." In
addition to providing a military deterrent to Iranian
irredentism, Britain engaged in a great deal of social
engineering aimed at the long term reduction or removal of
Iranian influence and culture from Bahrain. Embarking upon a
"
1 8Winston Churchill quoted in R. K. Ramazani, The
Persian Gulf: Iran's Role, (Charlottesville: University of
Virginia Press, 1972), pp. 21-22.
"Shireen Hunter, "Gulf Security: An Iranian
Perspective," p. 34.
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campaign of Arabization, Britain closed all Iranian schools in
Bahrain and imported teachers from Iraq. 20
Despite the nationalist accomplishments of Reza Shah, Iran
could not resist the allied invasion of 1941, which once again
left the country under control of foreign powers. In the
aftermath of the war, Soviet irredentist objectives were
evidenced by the annexation of Iranian Azerbaijan and the
creation.of "The Peoples Republic of Mahabad" a communist-
influenced, Kurdish state.
After the two World Wars, the "Great Game" continued as
the Cold War, with the great powers continuing their efforts
to control and limit their rival's access to Iran. Western
interference was only slightly less intrusive than that of the
Soviet Union. The United States and Britain are now known to
have engineered the Shah's counter-coup of 1953 which ousted
Prime Minister Mossadegh. The Shah's drive towards
modernization brought large numbers of western experts and
advisors into Iran. Beyond the implications of western
political and economic dominance, the Shah's support of
western secularism also created a perception of western
cultural dominance. 21
20See Fereydoun Adamiyat, Bahrain Islands: A Leqal and
Diplomatic Study of the British-Iranian Controvers , (New
York: Praeger, 1955).
"
2 1Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and The World, (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 9.
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The specter of foreign interference continues to haunt
Iran. The "imposed war" with Iraq was largely viewed as a
western-inspired plot to destroy Iran's new independence.
Implicit western support for Iraq combined with the United
States' direct involvement in the conflict in 1987-1988 is
considered further evidence of anti-Iranian foreign
interference.
While the ancient history of the Persian kings, Cyrus and
Darius, emphasizes Iran's potential greatness, more recent
history, especially that of the Iran-Iraq war, is
characterized by struggle, thwarted destiny, injustice and
foreign domination. The paradox of Iran's history (greatness
thwarted-by foreign interference) shapes Iran's security
perspective and contributes to its "xenophobia".
C. IDEOLOGY
Ideology serves to legitimate state power and to
rationalize its behavior, and it provides a framework
for action, both domestically and internationally. It
shapes states' perceptions of the outside world, of
their place within it, and the external realities upon
which they have to act. 22
The political ideology of the Islamic Republic is based on
the tenets of Shi'a Islam. Widely recognized as a religion of
political dissent, Shi'a Islam has served as an outlet for
22Ibid., p. 15.
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expression of Iranian nationalism and the defiance of foreign
dominance since the Arab conquest. Although it was not
declared the official religion of Iran until the 16th century,
Persians were early supporters of Shi'a Islam. Over time the
relationship between Shi'a Islam and Iranian identity has
become so intertwined as to be inseparable. An indicator of
the "Persianess" of Shi'a Islam is evidenced by the subtle
blend of -Zoroastrian2 3 concepts within the tenets of Shi'a
Islam.2 4 Both Zorastorianism and Shi'a Islam emphasize the
struggle between good and evil, the oppressed and the
oppressors. Both religions enjoin the faithful to fight
injustice and evil at all costs.
Efforts to establish Iranian political ideology based on
solely on Shi'ism or Persian nationalism have invariably
failed. In order to strengthen the monarchy and diminish the
political influence of the clergy, the Shah based his
political ideology on a return to the glorious days of pre-
Islamic Persian culture and empire. Ayatollah Khomeini
attempte4 to eliminate Iranian nationalism as a barrier to the
"
23Zoroastrianism is the original religion of Iran. It
was monotheistic and was founded by the prophet Zoroaster.
Like Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, Zoroastrianism has a
holy book, known as the Avesta.
"
24For an analysis of Zorastorian influence on Shi'a
Islam see William 0. Beeman, "Images of the Great Satan:
Representations of the United States in the Iranian
Revolution," Religion and Politics in Iran, edited by Nikki
Keddie, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983) p. 195.
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creation of a broad-based Islamic state. Neither of these
policies proved effective and each eventually met its demise.
While adherence to Shi'a Islam has helped strengthen and
ensure the survival of Iran as a nation, it has also increased
Iran's isolation. Arab-Persian rivalry was redefined and
intensified by conflict between the Shi'a and Sunni sects. The
animosity between Shi'ites and Sunnis is rarely understated.
Lord Curzon described the cleavage between these Muslim sects
thusly: "A devout Shi'a would almost leave off cutting a
Christian's throat to shift his grip to that of a cursed
Sunni" 25 The non-Arab Islamic states, which would appear to
be potential allies of Iran in the face of Arab intransigence,
are predominantly Sunni. Even relations with Afghanistan and
Tajikistan, the two states with the closest cultural and
linguistic ties to Iran, are inhibited by the ideological
differences between Sunni and Shi'a Islam.
These ideological differences continue to hinder Iran's
attempts to forge a wider sphere of influence in the region.
Although Ayatollah Khomeini attempted to downplay Shi'a-Sunni
ideological differences in his call for broad-based Islamic
revival, the Sunni states succeeded in portraying the Shi'a
nature of Iran's revolution as simply the heretical expression
of Iranian nationalism aimed at expanding Iran's influence in
the region. Iran's frustrated attempts to bridge the cultural
25Lord Curzon, Persia and The Persian Question. Volume
ii, (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1966), p. 585.
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and ideological gaps between itself and the remainder of the
Islamic world have exacerbated Iran's sense of isolation and
vulnerability.
In an international context, Shi'a ideology contributes to
Iran's xenophobic world view. The major themes of Iranian
Shi'ism (Twelver Shi'ism) emphasize the requirement to
struggle against injustice and oppression, within the context
of the continuing conflict between Dar Al-Harb (House of War,
i.e. the West) and Dar Al-Islam (the righteous Islamic world,
i.e. Iran). Parallels between recent history and the early
days of Shi'a Islam signify the influence of Shi'ism on Iran's
security perspective. It requires no great leap of faith for
an Iranian Shi'ite to envision Saddam Hussein as the assassin
Shemur, and the United States as the evil Umayyad Caliph
Yezid, who together first deceived Hussein Ibn Ali, the Shi'a
saint, and then had him murdered on the plains of Kerbala.
D. CULTURE
Discussions of the role of culture or "national character"
in the development of foreign policy suggests stereotyping and
are generally shunned in the field of political science.
However, the present propensity towards political correctness
in no way changes the reality that there exist distinct
cultural differences between societies and that these distinct
cultural features influence political events within nations.
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The influence of Iranian political culture on its world view
is particularly important.
The Persian culture may be the most durable culture in the
world. Geographic factors have certainly aided its durability
but its longevity owes even more to its ability to assimilate
foreign peoples. Every conqueror of Persia was eventually
conquered by Persian culture. Under the influence of Persian
culture, conquerors, from the Arabs to the Mongols, underwent
an amazing transformation.
Probably the most striking example of this absorption
is that of the Mongols, who entered the plateau as
barbarians reveling in slaughter and destruction
and after two generations of settled existence
became fervent and advocates of every aspect of
Iranian life. 26
Despite its durability and grand artistic features,
Iranian culture seems to be a paradox within itself. According
to Graham Fuller, a noted analyst of Iran's geopolitics,:
Persian culture betrays a profound schizophrenia, born
alternatively of a innate sense of superiority
stemming from a magnificent imperial past and rich
culture, and a nagging sense of inferiority and even
insecurity derived from Iran's experience of abject
conquest and foreign domination."
"
26Donald N. Wilber, p. 76.
"27Graham E. Fuller, p. 8.
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Within Iran the "culture of superiority" conflicts with
the "culture of conquest". 26 A glorious history combined with
the resilience of its culture has instilled a sense of pride
and superiority within Iran. Iran's political and cultural
domination of the region suggests that it should once again
achieve superiority over "lesser" regional states. The
difficulty of reconciling its perceived greatness with the
long periods of foreign domination have contributed to Iran's
suspicion of foreign powers. Iran attributes its denial of
greatness directly to the influence of great powers who seek
to exploit it.
Geography, history, ideology, and culture do influence
Iran's security perspective. It is not easy to isolate the
individual effects of each factor on Iran's security
persepective. Each has influenced the others. One could argue
that Iran's ideology has been greatly affected by geography
and culture. Together they form the lens through which Iran
analyzes its position within the international system. An
underlying theme of isolation, suspicion, vulnerability,
cultural and ideological superiority, and thwarted destiny,
has been created by the synergistic effects of these four
factors. To the West, Iran may seem to place undue emphasis on
its security but in Tehran's eyes its security is always
precariously perched on the edge of disaster.
29Ibid., p. 19.
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IV. IRAN'S THREAT PERCEPTIONS
When the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988, the Cold War
international system was still in place. The Soviet Union,
while greatly weakened, was still a superpower. Although
burdened by large foreign debts, Iraq was militarily more
powerful than ever. The United States had demonstrated its
continued animosity towards Iran by openly siding with Iraq
during the war, and by destroying a large portion of the
Iranian navy as a reprisal for Iran's mining of Persian Gulf
shipping lanes.' Iran was weak, isolated and vulnerable.
From 1988 until 1991 Iran's rearmament was understandable
and accepted by an international community that still feared
communist expansion and Iraqi aggression. After the demise of
Iraq and the Soviet Union, Iran's continued efforts to rebuild
its military have been viewed in a less favorable light.
Western concerns aside, the view from Tehran suggests that its
rearmament is justified.
Security strategies are a state's response to its
perceived threats. In order to analyze these strategies, one
must understand the broad spectrum of threats confronting a
given state. This chapter will examine Iran's view of its
'On 18 April 1988, the U.S. and Iranian navies engaged
in a majQr surface action. The battle was precipitated by
U.S. attacks on Iranian oil platforms in response to Iran's
mining of the Persian Gulf. The U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts
nearly sank when it struck an Iranian mine on 13 April 1988.
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security in relation to other regional states and major
foreign powers. It will focus on issues that exacerbate Iran's
security dilemma and will provide the foundation for analysis
of Iran's strategic capabilities and beliefs in the following
chapter.
A. IRAQ
Iraq .remains Iran's chief security concern. Irano-Iraqi
relations are historically tense. The issue of control over
the Shatt Al-Arab represents more than a struggle over a
strategic inland waterway. The Shatt Al-Arab is the physical
incarnation of the historical, ideological, and cultural chasm
separating Shi'ite Iran from the Arab-Sunni world. Control of
the Shatt Al-Arab implies dominance of one side over the
other. Regardless of the status of relations between the two
states, geography dictates Iran's caution regarding Iraq.
Of primary concern are the unprotected Khuzestan oil
fields, Iran's primary source of income. Situated in the
eastern Tigris-Euphrates valley, west of the Zagros mountains,
Khuzestan is extremely vulnerable to penetration from the west
and is isolated from the east. A successful attack in this
area would quickly threaten the vital northern port facilities
at Kharq Island and Bushire.
The 2 August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, followed by the
continuing repression of the Shi'ites in southern Iraq, has
confirmed Iran's suspicions of inherent Iraqi aggression.
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Despite its defeat in Kuwait, Iraq enjoys a significant
conventional advantage, at least quantitatively, over Iran.
For example, in the critical areas of armor and artillery,
Iraq retains a respectable offensive capability estimated at
2200 main battle tanks, 2700 armored vehicles and 1700
artillery pieces. 2
The U.N. monitored destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) capabilities is more a source of concern
than relief to Iran. U.N. inspectors were shocked by the
extent of Iraq's nuclear program and the ingenuity with which
it was administered and concealed. General suspicion of poor
western intelligence and Iraqi guile and cunning suggests that
Iraq still retains much of its strategic capability despite UN
efforts. Some experts estimate that Iraq retains "very
substantial chemical feed stocks and that somewhere between 70
to 120 SCUD or extended range SCUD assemblies are still
somewhere inside Iraq". 3 At the -least Iraq retains the
technical expertise, if not the hardware, required to rebuild
its nuclear infrastructure. 4
A curious twist has developed in the analysis of Iraq's
military capabilities. Analysts criticizing Iran's rearmament
2The Military Balance 1993-1994, (London: Brassey's
Ltd., 1993), p. 117.
3Anthony Cordesman, quoted in "Symposium on Dual
Containment," Middle East Policy, Vol. III, No. 1, 1994, p.
11.
4William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass,
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 59.
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program are quick to point out Iraq's military impotence,
while analysts arguing for continued Western military presence
in the Gulf point out the vast capabilities retained by Iraq.I
Regardless of Iraq's present strength, the temporary reduction
of its conventional and unconventional forces has presented
Tehran with a window of "strategic opportunity" during which
it may close the gap between itself and Baghdad. 6
B. SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL (GCC)
While Irano-Saudi disputes are usually veiled in
ideological rhetoric, the true source of contention revolves
around the issues of political dominance of the Persian Gulf
and influence over world oil prices.' The emergence of Saudi
Arabia as the de facto leader of the Gulf Arab states has been
accelerated by the defeat of Iraq. Saudi Arabia's expanding
influence in the Gulf principalities has eroded Iran's
influence, despite its traditional relationship with the large
5For a discussion of the iegeneration of Iraq's
conventi6nal and unconventional military capabilities see
Thomas Sancton, "No Longer Fenced In," Time, 23 May 1994,
pp. 36-38.
'Michael Eisenstadt, "Deja Vu All Over Again? An
Assessment of Iran's Military Buildup," Iran's Strategic
Intentions and Capabilities, ed., Patrick Clawson,
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1994), p.
98.
?For an overview of the role of oil in Iran-Saudi
relations see M.E. Ahrari, "Saudi Arabia, Iran and OPEC: The
Dynamics of a Balancing Act," The Gulf and International
Sut, ed., M.E. Ahrari, (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1989), pp. 69-88.
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communities of Iranian immigrants and Shi'a Muslims that
occupy the east coast and islands of the Saudi peninsula.'
Iran views the Gulf Cooperation Council as an anti-Iranian
military alliance and an attempt to further isolate it in the
region.' These beliefs are not without basis. Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait openly supported Iraq during the war with Iran. In
addition to financial, logistic, and intelligence support for
Iraq, these two states engaged in economic war'are against
Iran; intentionally over-producing oil, forcing dowr the price
of oil and limiting Iran's access to hard currency required to
fund its war effort.' 0
The defeat of Iraq in 1991 presented an opportunity for
rapprochement between the Iran and the GCC states, and it
seemed for a period that detente might take hold.
Unfortunately, Iran pursued its relations in an aggressive and
at times, arrogant manner, demanding not only participation
but a leading role in post-war security arrangements. These
maneuvers revived Arab suspicions of Iranian grand designs of
regional hegemony. As such, Iran's post-war efforts to break
out of its regional isolation have been largely frustrated.
8 For more on the relationship between Iran and the
Arab Shi'ites of the Gulf see R.K. Ramazani, "Shi'ism in the
Persian Gulf," Shi'ism and Social Protest, ed., Juan R.I.
Cole and Nikki R. Keddie, (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1986), pp. 30-54.
'Shireen Hunter, "Iran and The Arab World," Iran At The




Iran's stance on regional security seems well-balanced.
Despite Western claims that it is seeking to dominate the
region, Iran's position on Gulf security stresses the
importance of regional cooperation and self-sufficiency. Iran
has consistently called for the formation of a regional
security organization that includes all the states of the
region, even Iraq. In a recent interview, Ali Akbar Velayati,
the Foreign Minister of Iran, stated:
Safeguarding security in the Gulf region is a critical
issue for all countries of the region. This issue is
of strategic importance for all states, not only Iran,
Iraq, or the Gulf Cooperation Council members."
Despite its apparent logic, Iran's proposal for the
establishment of a regional security organization as set forth
by U.N. resolution 598 has been rejected by the GCC states"2 .
The Gulf states realize that if a regional security
organization was established, Iran, by nature of its
population, size, and natural resources, would play what they
deem an unacceptably dominant role.
The Gulf states' rejection of a regionally-based security
organization has been accompanied by an open alliance with the
"Ali Akbar Velayati, Foreign Minister of Iran, quoted
in Zaki Shihab, "Velayati: We oppose the agreement with
Israel, but we will not change our policy towards Syria,"
AL-WASAT, London, 14-20 March 1994, p. 23.
12U.N. resolution 598 secured the cease-fire between
Iraq and Iran and calls for the establishment of a regional
security organization.
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United States and its allies (France and Great Britain), and
a massive conventional arms buildup. Although deterrence of
future Iraqi aggression is cited as justification for the
buildup, the specific nature of the weapons being purchased
gives Iran cause for alarm. Considering Iraq's limited access
to the sea, the Gulf states' emphasis on acquiring naval
weapons systems can be only directed at Iran.
Saudi Arabia already has the most powerful navy in the
Gulf and is expanding its capabilities significantly. When
planned procurements are completed, Saudi Arabia's navy will
have seven frigates, four corvettes, nine missile attack boats
in addition to minesweepers and support craft."3 The United
Arab Emirates is pursuing the acquisition of as many as 10
frigates. Bahrain is also interested in acquiring a frigate,
the "capital ship" of the Gulf.' 4 The combined naval forces
of the GCC are clearly superior to Iran's navy and in times of
conflict could conceivably deny Iran's access to vital Indian
Ocean supply routes.
Another source of Iran's anxiety is the wide technological
gap between its weapon procurements and those being purchased
by the Gulf states. While Iran has been limited both
financially and politically to the less sophisticated and
"13Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Iran's National Strategy:
Striving.for Regional Parity or Supremacy," International
Defense Review, April 1994, p. 37.
"
4Author's conversation with a senior U.S. official,
Bahrain, March 1994.
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perhaps less reliable weapons of third world suppliers
(Russia, China, and North Korea), the Gulf states are buying
the most modern and technologically advanced systems
available. Iran's limite!d number of top-of-the-line Soviet
aircraft, such as the MIG-29 (58), SU-24 (20), and the
reported purchase of twelve TU-22 Backfire bombers, are cited
as proof of Iran's hegemonic thrust in the Gulf."5 Yet a
quick tally of the Saudi Air Force inventory reveals a sizable
Saudi advantage. Presently Saudi Arabia possesses 78 F-15Cs,
72 Tornadoes, 51 F-5Es and 5 E-3A AWACS.16 Further augmented
by the air forces of Bahrain (12 Fi6s, 12 F-5s), and Kuwait
(22 A-4s, 40 F-18s, 15 Mirage Fl), the GCC presents a
formidable air combat capability that Iran would be hard
pressed to match, even in the absence of U.S. forces.
Iran even lags behind the GCC in the area of strategic
weapons. While the world decries Iran's attempts to acquire
the North Korean No-Dong 1, intermediate range missile, Saudi
Arabia possesses the one of the most accurate and longest




6The Military Balance 1993-1994, p. 127.
"According to most estimates the No-Dong 1 has a range
of approximately 1000km and a "poor" CEP, while the CSS-2
has a range of approximately 2000km and a CEP of 1200-2000
meters. See "The Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles," Arms
Control Today, April 92, pp. 28-29, and Shahram Chubin,
Iran's National Security Policy: Ca~abilities. Intentions
anld Impc, (Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 1994), p. 58.
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significance of Saudi Arabia's ballistic missile force is
increased by the belief that U.S. supplied Patriot missile
systems will provide it some measure of defense against
ballistic missiles.
C. ISRAEL
Iran has the potential of becoming the regional
superpower, or minisuperpower, to replace Iraq in the
Persian Gulf. Iran will realize that potential if left
undisturbed."8
Israel presents a unique challenge for Iran. Its special
relationship with the United States and its nuclear capability
warrant caution. Israel points out Iran's opposition to the
peace process as evidence of Iranian animosity and its
potential threat to Israel. For Iran, however, the peace
process is not a bilateral issue. Successful conclusion of the
Arab-Israeli peace process threatens to further isolate
Iran."9 The Palestinian issue has provided Iran with
one of the very few vehicles with which it may exert its
influence in the region. Deprived of this issue as a political
"leMajor General Uri Sagi, Director of Israeli Military
Intelligence, 17 April 1992, quoted in Eisenstadt, p. 93.
Emphasis added by author.
"19In'a 17 March 1994 speech to The Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, Mr. Anthony Lake, President Clinton's
National Security Advisor, stated that one of the benefits
of the Arab-Israeli peace process would be the further
isolation of Iran and Iraq.
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vehicle, Iran will be more limited in its ability to influence
Arab regimes in Syria and Lebanon. Additionally, the Arab-
Israeli conflict has pre-occupied Israel, allowing Iran to
escape the focused attention of Israeli leaders that will
surely follow a comprehensive peace accord. Since the defeat
of Iraq, Israel has indeed refocused its attention on Iran as
its major regional rival.
The Iranian threat to Israel, real or imagined, presents
a challenge that Israel can not meet through conventional
means.
Israel alone can do very little to halt the Iranians.
We could raid Iran from the air, but we cannot
realistically expect that our aerial operations could
destroy all their capabilities. At best, some Iranian
nuclear installations could in this way be destroyed,
but not all; not even their major centers of nuclear
development, especially since that development has
proceeded along three different lines in a fairly
decentralized manner, with installations and
factories scattered widely across the country. It is
reasonable to suppose that we will never know the
locations of all their installations, as in the case
of Iraq.20
In one scholar's opinion, Israel's recognition of its limited
ability to influence Iran through unilateral conventional
action has led it to pursue the formation of anti-Iranian
coalitions, while at the same time emphasizing its nuclear
20Daniel Lesham, a retired senior military officer who
is currently a member of the Center for Strategic Research
at Tel Aviv University, quoted in Israel Shahak, "Israel
seeks to build a coalition against Iran," M
International, 6 August 1993, p. 16.
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option as a means of preventing Iran's emergence as a nuclear
power. 21
Against its distant enemies Israel will have to rely
not so much on conventional components of the Israeli
army as on nuclear deterrence, long-range missiles and
improved cooperation with the United States and some
neighboring states, like Egypt and Turkey. 2 2
Acutely aware of Israel's nuclear advantage, Iran has
consistently called for the establishment of a nuclear free
zone in the Middle East and takes every opportunity to decry
what appears to be a double standard in the application of
non-proliferation policies in the region.
Iran Was the first state to propose the implementation
of a "nuclear weapons free zone" in the Middle East.
We continue to subscribe to this concept and are
prepared to consider constructive initiatives in this
respect .... but Israel's nuclear policies in complete
violation of international treaties is equivalent to
tacit approval of the regimes access to nuclear
weapons. It is hard for the international community to
understand this duality. 23
21For a discussion of Israeli nuclear strategy for
confronting Iran see Louis Rene Beres, "Israel, Iran, and
Prospects For Nuclear War In The Middle East," Strategic
Review, Spring 1993, pp. 52-57.
22Professor Shlomo Ahronson, quoted in Israel Shahak,
p. 16.
23Reza Amrollahi, Director of Iran's Atomic Energy
Organization, address to the 37th session of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, quoted in an Islamic
Republic News Agency broadcast, 28 September 1993.
"Amrollahi Speaks on U.N. Role, Nuclear Issues at IAEA,"
FBIS-JPRS-TND-93-034, 27 October 1993.
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Combined with its pre-disposition for engagement in preventive
war, Israel's strategic capabilities provide strong incentives
for Iran to balance these threats with strategic weapons of
its own.
Chemical and biological weapons are the poor man's
atomic bombs and can be easily produced. We should at
least consider them for our defense. 2
Israel's influence with the West is another source of
Iran's anxiety. In a land where nothing is believed to occur
by accident, the "hidden hand" of Israel is seen to be heavily
involved in the development and implementation of U.S.
policies aimed at the further isolation of Iran. The policy of
"dual containment", authored by Martin Indyk, Special
Assistant to the National Security Council for Middle East
Policy, is considered by Iran to be a classic example of the
deptL of Israeli influence in the development of U.S. Middle
East policy. 25 Iran's suspicion may be justified. Prior to
his appointment to the National Security Council, Mr. Indyk
was formerly the director of the Washington Institute for Near
24President Rafsanjani, 19 October 1988, Islamic
Republic News Agency, quoted in Shahram Chubin, p. 28.
2 5
"The U.S. Echelons Do Not Comprehend Facts," Jomhuri-
yeIs.lami, Tehran, 4 October 1993, p. 1, and "The Strategy
of Dual Containment," Jahan-e-Islam, Tehran, 3 March 1994,
p. 2 of supplement.
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East Policy, which is funded by the American-Israeli Public
Affairs Committee (AIPAC) 26 .
D. INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND PROLIFURATION IN SOMTH ASIA
Iran enjoys good relations with both India and Pakistan,
despite several sensitive issues, such as the Kashmir crisis
in India and the extensive influence of Saudi Arabia in
Pakistan. Iran's attempts to break out of its regional
isolation have been most successful along its southeastern
frontier. Nevertheless, the combination of chronic instability
and nuclear proliferation in South Asia presents a significant
threat to Iran's national security.
India's emergence as the dominant power in South Asia is
both boon and bane for Iran. While India and Iran pursue
similar strategic objectives, namely the reduction of
superpower presence in the region, India's military
superiority is a source of concern. Iran is particularly aware
of the vital role of Pakistan as a buffer between itself and
India and is committed to its security. 2" Any future Indian
attempts to absorb, weaken, or divide Pakistan would
constitute a serious threat tc the security of Iran.
26Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Friends in Deed: Inside
The U.S.-Israel Alliance, (New York: Hyperion, 1994), p.
446.
"2'Shireen Hunter, Iran And The World, (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1990), pp. 131-133, and 135-136.
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A fourth Indo-Pakistani war with its nuclear implications,
could be potentially disastrous for Iran. Such a conflict
would provide justification for increased superpower
intervention and presence in the region. Iran's important
joint economic ventures with both India and Pakistan would
certainly be damaged, not to mention the issue of a potential
refugee crisis of staggering proportion. 2 In the event of an
impending Indian victory, Iran might be compelled to intervene
on the behalf of Pakistan. Accordingly, Iran pursues a very
cautious line of diplomacy in South Asia; avoiding
confrontation with India over Kashmir and ignoring Pakistan's
close ties to Saudi Arabia and the United States. 2 9
India's capability to project power through its naval
forces is another factor Iran must consider. 30 Any state
capable of denying Iran's access to the Indian Ocean
constitutes a potential threat. A regional rivalry may develop
2 8Iran is presently host to the largest refugee
community in the world, an unenviable position that severely
strains Iran's feeble economy. According to a United NationsReport Iran hosts 21 percent (4.1 million people) of the
world's known 19.7 million refugees. See "Iran RanksUnenviable First," IaTime, Washington, D.C., 19 November
1993, p..16.
"
2 9Iran's position on Kashmir has been fluid- more vocal
when tensions are low, quieter when tensions are high.Recently, Iran has sought to mediate the dispute and has
achieved some success in this regard. For a discussion of
the joint Chinese-Iranian proposal for placing observers in
Kashmir see I an _ime, 11 March 1994, p. 15.
"India possesses the most powerful regional navalforce. India's major combatants include two aircraft
carriers, five destroyers, 17 frigates and 15 submarines.
The Military Balance 1993-1994, p. 138.
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if India begins to push its expanding influence into the
Northern Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, and Persian Gulf.
Iran's adept handling of its relations with India and
Pakistan have helped reduce tension. The threat along Iran's
southeastern flank appears relatively benign if viewed in
isolation. However, when combined with the Iraqi threat and
the potential for unrest along Iran's northern borders, the
image of an Iran awash in a sea of turmoil becomes more vivid.
E. TURKEY
From the end of World War I until 1979, Iran and Turkey
enjoyed close, mutually-beneficial relations. While relations
were strained during the early years of the Islamic
Revolution, mutual interests have moderated positions on both
sides. In 1988 Iran joined Pakistan and Turkey, in forming an
economic alliance known as the Economic Cooperation
Council." Despite this rapprochement, contentious issues
continue to complicate relations. Ifan is primarily concerned
about the expansion of Turkey's influence in Northern Iraq,
Azerbaijan and the Central Asian Republics.
Resurgent nationalism in Azerbaijan presents the greatest
challenge to Irano-Turkish relations. One third of Iran's
population is Azeri and speak a turkish dialect as their
3 1Mushahid Hussain, "Iran Forges New Links," ,
East International, 17 February 1989, p. 17.
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native language.32 In the past Iran's Azeri population was
considered to be very well integrated into Iran, possessing
very little political affinity with the Soviet Azeris to the
north." However, northern Azerbaijan's independence, the war
with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabagh, and increasing cultural
and commercial contacts between the north and the south, have
sensitized Iran's Azeri population to their cultural identity.
Iran's concern over Azeri separatism is heightened by the
Azerbaijan's official stance supporting unification of the
north and south and close association with Turkey. •
Another sensitive issue involves the situation in northern
Iraq. Iran fears the expansion of Turkish authority into
northern Iraq. The U.N. sponsored autonomous zone in northein
Iraq has been described by Iranian officials as a "new
Israel", an artificial state created to serve the purposes of
Turkey and the United States. 35 Iran's concerns in this
matter are reflected by its support for unified Iraq.
We believe completely in the protection of the unity
of Iraq, its people and its independence. Attempts to
establish an independent state in either the north or
"3Helen Chapin Metz, Ed., Ir a country study,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989),
p. 323.
"Graham E. Fuller and Ian 0. Lesser, Turkey's New
Geo&oliUij, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 82.
"I4 bid, p. 83.
"Ibid, p. 66.
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the south threatens the security of Iran. We will
strongly oppose such attempts. 3 6
Turkey has engaged in its own rearmament and military
modernization program. The goal of this ten-year program is to
transform Turkey's technologically obsolete infantry based
force into a smaller, more modern and technologically
advanced, combined arms army, based on a armored and
mechanized force structure.37  In conjunction with this
program, Turkey has acquired advanced deep strike aircraft
(126 F16s 38 ) and an airborne refueling capability. 39
More than its growing powerful military, Turkey's close
alliance with the United States is a sensitive issue for Iran.
The presence of the airbase at Incerlik, provides the United
States with one more option for striking Iran militarily. Iran
is leery'of U.S. and Saudi support for Turkey's attempts to
establish its pre-eminence in the Central Asian republics,
viewing this as further evidence of a Western conspiracy to
isolate Iran.
36Ali Akbar Velayati, Foreign Minister of Iran, quoted
in Zaki Shihab, "Velayati: We oppose the agreement with
Israel, but we will not change our policy towards Syria,"
AL-WASAT, London, 14-20 March 1994, p. 24.
"Ahmed Hashim, "Iran's Military Situation," Iran's
Strategic Intentions and Capabilities, ed., Patrick Clawson,
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1994), p.
173.
"
38The Military Balance 1993-1994, p.61.
"Ahmed Hashim, p. 174.
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TABLE 4.1: REGIONAL BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES
STATE COMBAT TANKS ARTILLERY COMBAT
AIRCRAFT SHIPS
IRAN 293 700+ 2300 8
2 SUBS
IRAQ 216 2200 1730 1
ISRAEL 704 3960 1684 3 SUBS
SAUDI 296 696 570 8
ARABIA
TURKEY 973 4835 4551 19
15 SUBS
PAKISTAN 441 1890 2205 14
6 SUBS
INDIA 355 3400 3325 24
15 SUBS
Source: The Military Balance 1993-1994, (London: Brassey's
Ltd., 1993).
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F. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
From Tehran's perspective the presence of U.S. naval
forces in the Gulf is a very serious threat to its national
security. This force provides the United States with the
option to conduct air and cruise missile strikes throughout
Iran, impose a naval blockade, and generally limit Iran's
participation in any regional security arrangements.
Specifically, as long as the United States maintains a
significant naval presence, the GCC states will not feel
compelled to include Iran in any type of regional security
organization.
Iran has been highly critical of the Gulf states' post-war
military agreements with the United States and its allies.
Iran asserts that the United States is the catalyst of the
Gulf arms race, attempting to instill fear in the Arab Gulf
states as a means of encouraging arms purchases that aid
America's stagnant economy and increase dependence on the
United States for security.' 0
Recent history justifies Iran's threat perception
regarding the United States. In addition to U.S.-sponsored
political and economic intrigues, Iran has been the target of
several U.S. military operations. U.S. involvement in the
40"The Inauspicious Intentions of the United States and
the Negligence of the Arabs," Resalat, Tehran, 8 December
1993, p. 16.
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Tanker War of 1987-1988 entailed several minor skirmishes4",
the capture of an Iranian mine-layer4 2 , and culminated with
the destruction of a large portion of the Iranian navy in the
largest surface engagement since World War 11. 43
Iranian anxiety over the U.S. threat is not limited to
conventional military operations. Iran believes the United
States to be a sponsor of anti-Iranian terrorism, noting U.S.
involvement in the 1984 bombing of the residence of
Hezbullah's spiritual leader, Shaykh Fadlallah, in Lebanon44,
congressional support for the Mujahidin-e-Khalq, and the
airbus tragedy as examples.
4 1Between July 1987 and December 1988, the U.S. navy
was engaged in Operation "Ernest Will", the naval escort for
re-flagged Kuwaiti oil tankers. During the course of this
operation there were several small incidents involving U.S.
special forces, and Iranian Republican Guard gunboats. The
most significant event took place 8 October 1987 when U.S.
helicopters were fired on by Iranian gunboats, subsequently
returning fire and destroying three boats. Salvage
operations revealed the first evidence that Iran had
acquired Stinger missiles.
4221 September 1987, the Iran AJR was caught in the act
of mining international waters, attacked and captured.
43Operation "Praying Mantis" was the U.S. response to
Iranian mining of international waters that resulted in the
near-destruction of the frigate, U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts.
"44For more on U.S. involvement in the bombing see
Robin Wright, Sacred Rage, (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1986), pp. 96-97, and Bob Woodward,*Veil, (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1988), pp. 450-456.
60
G. RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA
The dissolution of the Soviet Union has temporarily
removed the greatest traditional threat to Iran's national
security. The independence of the Central Asian Republics has
provided. Iran with a valuable opportunity to expand its
influence and establish a Central Asian alliance that would
serve as a buffer zone between itself and Russia. Iran is
exerting great effort to establish economic and political ties
with the new republics4".
While the breakup of the Soviet Union was welcomed by
Iran, its security problems along its northern borders are
more complex than ever. It is ironic that in a predominantly
Muslim Central Asia, Iran is faced with the dilemma of
choosing between Islamic ideology and securing its national
interests. The independence of the Central Asian republics has
been accompanied by two troubling phenomena: the resurgence of
ethno-nationalism, and internal conflicts. Ethnic conflicts,
such as the war in Azerbaijan, could potentially create
internal strife between Iran's minorities. Continuing
instability increases the likelihood of renewed Russian
intervention in region. Direct Iranian involvement in either
the Azeri or Tajik conflict would likely induce a Russian
"See interview with Ali Akbar Velayati, Foreign
Minister of Iran, by Talal Salmon in Al-Safir, Beirut, 27
November 1993, p. 11.
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response." The endless civil war in Afghanistan has burdened
Iran with millions of Afghan refugees and contributes to
general regional instability.
Iran's relations with Russia are generally good. Russia is
an important source of technology and weapons and may still be
an effective counter to U.S. influence, as recently witnessed
in Bosnia. Russian nationalism is a serious concern for Iran.
This is compounded by Russian military leaders who emphasize
the "Islamic Threat" as justification for continued or
expanded Russian presence in the region."'
In surmmary, Iran's threat perceptions are analogous to the
many straws that, when added together, eventually break the
camel's back. At the present time, Iran is not facing an
overwhelming threat from any one state or alliance. However,
based on the instability of the region, Iran believes its
position is precarious. Iran's response to its perception of
threat is exemplified by its strategic weapons program.
"
4 bIran has approached both of these issues with extreme
caution. Initially supporting the Armenians in the Azeri and
avoiding confrontation with the Russians in Tajikistan.
47For example see Colonel A. Zabelin and 0. Cherneta,
"Iran's Military Policy," Foreian Military Review, Moscow,
April 1993,in FBIS-JPRS, Central Eurasia, 13 October 1993,
p. 2-4. Dmitry Volskiy, "Observer's View: Iran-Central Asia:
Export of Commodities and Not of Ideological Merchandise,"
New Times International, Moscow, October 1993, in FBIS-JPRS,
Central Eurasia, 8 December 1993, p. 24.
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V. IRAN'S STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES AND BELIEFS
States may pursue several options in an attempt to balance
a threat. They generally will form either a balancing alliance
with other states which face the same threat, (safety in
numbers), engage in internal balancing (military buildup), or
attempt to negate the threat by capitulating or allying
(bandwagoning) with the source of threat (if you can't beat
em, join em) .1 The first two options are employed with great
regularity. The third option is a more rare occurrence.
History counsels against "bandwagoning". Historically, Iran
has attempted to form alliances against its perceived threats
but has achieved only marginal success. By default, it must
seek to balance internally.
A state which is resigned to balance internally must
consider several factors when developing its military
strategy. These include the nature of the threat (aggregate
power, proximity, offensive capability, and offensive
intentions)2 , and the resources available to balance the
threat (economic strength, demography, technology, geography,
etc.). A state with limited resources, threatened by
overwhelming force which it cannot counter conventionally,
'Stephen Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of




will rationally seek to obtain the strategic capabilities it
believes will balance the threat.
Iran's threat perceptions are multi-dimensional and
diverse. Its strategies for countering each perceived threat
vary accordingly. Iran has engaged in a conventional
rearmament program aimed at the development and maintenance of
a military force capable of ensuring internal stability
(Kurdish or other internal threats), countering regional
threats (Iraq, or Turkey and containment of conflicts that
threaten.to spill over into Iran) and providing a limited
deterrent to invasion by a major foreign power. Other threats
seem to require a strategic response. The proliferation of
ballistic missiles, and nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons in the region requires a strategy of strategic
deterrence. The conventional superiority of the U.S. Navy in
the Persian Gulf requires a strategic sea denial capability.
A. THE EVOLUTION OF IRAN'S STRATEGIC PHILOSOPHY
Iran's strategic philosophy has changed 360 degrees in the
last 16 years. Under Mohammed Reza Shah, Iran's strategic
philosophy emphasized the acquisition of the most advanced
technology and the maintenance of a professionally trained
armed force. After the revolution, the leaders of Iran, who
were distrustful of the professional military, emphasized
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reliance on revolutionary Islamic zeal, morale and popular
support.3
Victory is not achieved by swords, it can only be
achieved by blood... it is achieved by strength of
faith. 4
This new philosophy gradually withered under Iraq's superior
firepower. By 1988, Iran's philosophy had come full circle.
Military leaders attributed Iran's defeat to its technological
disadvantage. "They had armor and we did not.. .We were unarmed
infantrymen against the enemy's cavalry.'"5
The war with Iraq not only caused Iran's leaders to
refocus on the importance of technology for conventional
forces, it also accentuated Iran's vulnerability to strategic
weapons, such as ballistic missiles and chemical weapons.
Operation Desert Storm would serve to confirm Iran's strategic
beliefs about the need for technology at both the conventional
and strategic level.
3Shahram Chubin, Iran's National Security Policy:
Capabilities. Intentions and Impact, (Washington, D.C.: The
Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 1994), p. 17.
4Ayatollah Khomeini, 1982, quoted in Ahmed Hashim,
"Iran's Military Situation," Iran's Strategic Intentions and
CaDabilities, ed., Patrick Clawson, (Washington, D.C.:
National Defense University, 1994), p. 160.
5Mohsen Rezai, Commander of the Revolutionary Guards,
Tehran TV, 22 September 1988, quoted in Shahram Chubin,
p.17.
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Iran had already embarked on its rearmament program when
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1991. The subsequent
display of technological wizardry that accompanied the allied
victory forced Iran to evaluate its new strategic philosophy.
The lesson that emerged was clear. Despite access to advanced
technology, Iraq's conventional forces, which were far
superior to all other regional forces, were no match for a
superpower like the United States. On the other hand, specific
weapon systems with strategic applications, such as ballistic
missiles and underwater mines could have an impact on the
enemy.
A theme has emerged in Iran's strategic philosophy that
emphasizes the acquisition of weapon systems that meet two
criteria: survivability and ease of operation. This is not
only a reflection of military considerations but is also
indicative of the regime's continuing distrust of a
professional military force. These political concerns are
evidenced by the assignment of the Revolutionary Guards
instead of the regular military to the missile forces. 6 Iran's
growing sea denial capabilities epitomize its new strategic
philosophy. Fast attack missile craft, coastal anti-ship
missile batteries, and underwater mines, seek to maximize the
advantages of modern technology and exploit the weaknesses of
Iran's major naval threat, the U.S. navy.
'Shahram Chubin, p. 32.
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B. SEA DENIAL
Iran's purchases of two Soviet Kilo-class submarines, SU-
24 long-range bombers, Silkworm missiles, and large quantities
of underwater mines have created anxiety in the West.
Congruent with its policy of seeking weapon systems that are
survivable and require only minimum crew training and
proficiency, Iran is focusing its sea denial efforts in two
main areas: underwater mines and anti-ship missile systems.
The Iran-Iraq war taught Iran the flexibility and
strategic applications of mine warfare. 7 In July 1987 Iran
successfully mined the deep-water channels of the Gulf without
detection and inflicted at least a moral defeat on the United
States when the re-flagged Kuwaiti supertanker Bridgeton stuck
a mine during the very first U.S. escorted convoy. These
beliefs were reinforced during Operation Desert Storm. The
inability of coalition forces to clear shallow water mines
from the coast of Iraq seemingly deterred an impending
amphibious invasion. Iraqi mines were one of the few weapons
systems to inflict significant damage to coalition forces. The
U.S.S. Princeton and the U.S.S. Tripoli were disabled when
they struck mines.
'After the United States began escorting re-flagged
Kuwaiti tankers in 1987, Iran began laying mines in the
Persian Gulf shipping lanes. An estimated 200 mines were
laid, resulting in damage to 10 ships. Anthony Cordesman and
Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1990), p. 565, and Ted Hooton, "The Tanker
War in the Gulf," Jane's Intelliaence Revie w, May 1992, p.
22.
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Iran does have a large supply of underwater mines. In
testimony before the Seapower and Strategic and Critical
Materials Subcommittee of the House'Armed Services Committee
on Intelligence, Rear Admiral William 0. Studeman testified
that Iran possesses approximately 2000 underwater mines of
various type and origin.' The majority of these appear to be
moored contact mines. These include the Soviet M-08 and the
MYaM, a North Korean mine which Iran now produces
domestically. 9 While they are very simple to manufacture and
employ, these mines are also the easiest to counter. The
shallow depths at which these mines must sit in order to make
contact with a ship's hull enhance visual detection from the
air, while their metal skin allows for sonar detection.
Additionally, the hydrography of the Persian Gulf and the
Straits of Hormuz limits their usefulness. Tidal currents in
the Gulf and especially the Straits of Hormuz are very strong.
This can cause tethered mines to dip below effective depths,
or worse, snap the anchor cables."0
Iran's acquisition of deep-water, rising mines is a more
serious issue. If acquired in large numbers, and effectively
employed, these mines would enhance Iran's ability to deny
' Michael Eisenstadt, " Deja Vu All Over Again? An
Assessment Of Iran's Military Buildup," Iran's Strategic
Intentions and Capabilities, ed., Patrick Clawson,





enemy naval forces access to the Straits of Hormuz and the
Gulf during a crisis."
Iran augments its mine warfare capabilities with a limited
anti-ship missile force. This force is primarily built around
the Chinese HY-2 Silkworm anti-ship missile in its various
forms.' 2 Iran is believed to have approximately 50 Silkworm
missiles and four operational launchers, presumably located
on Qesham Island in the straits.' Iran has also received the
Chinese C801 anti-ship missile. Unlike the Silkworm, which is
considered to be easily defeated by electronic
countermeasures, the C801 is more advanced." 4 It is a
supersonic sea skimming missile with a 70km range and a 500kg
warhead.' 5
In addition to its shore-based missile force, Iran also
employs a small number of fast missile craft. Of the 10 Kaman
"According to reports Iran is negotiating the purchase
of EM52 rocket-propelled mines from China. The EM52 is
designed to be laid by surface vessels in water up to 110
meters deep. It has a 140kg warhead, a ship counting
capability, and a 360 day service life. "Tehran's weapons'
buyers are very busy," Iran Times, 28 January 1994, p. 15.
International Defense Review, June 1991, p. 625.
12The Silkworm can carry up to an 1100 pound warhead,
has a maximum range of 95km, but is most effective under




4Michael A. Palmer, On Course to Desert Storm: The
United States Navy and the Persian Gulf, (Washington, D.C.:
Naval Historical Center, 1992), p. 122.
"
5Shahram Chubin, p. 44.
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class (ex-French Combattante II) missile boats in Iran's
possession it is estimated that only five are operational."6
Six of these craft were configured for the Harpoon anti-ship
missile but only a very small number of missiles were
delivered prior to the revolution."' Nonetheless, during the
major surface engagement of 18 April 1988 one of these craft,
the Joshan, fired a Harpoon at the American cruiser
Wainwright. The Joshan was subsequently destroyed by missile
fire from the Wainwright and the American frigate Simpson."8
Iran has acquired three North Korean Chaho class fast attack
craft but these are reported to be armed only with guns. 1 9
Reports indicate that Iran is seeking to purchase 10 Hegu-
class fast attack craft from China. If acquired, these craft
will likely be armed with the shipboard version of the C801
anti-ship missile. 20
Iran's purchase of Soviet Kilo-class submarines appears to
run counter to its new philosophy of buying user-friendly
technology. When the submarines were initially ordered in 1989
they were intended to counter Iraq's growing naval threat. At
the time Iraq was due to receive six new frigates from
"Ahmed Hashim, p. 191.






Italy.21  Iran's leaders may believe that the inherent
stealth of submarines justifies their expense and the effort
required to properly train the crews. The vulnerability of
Iran's surface fleet to air attacks during its battles with
the U.S. navy in 1988 reinforces the belief that submarines
will provide a more survivable platform for countering enemy
naval forces.
These submarines will augment Iran's sea denial
capabilities but only in a very limited manner. Despite the
anxiety generated by their purchase, Iran's submarines
represent only a limited threat to the Arab Gulf states or
U.S. forces. Russian newspaper reports indicate that the
Iranian crews are unable to operate submerged for more than a
few hours. 2 The advantages of shallow water operation that
the Persian Gulf affords submarines are offset by the
increased demands for crew proficiency, access to detailed
hydrographic data, and meticulous mission planning. 23 If
besed at the naval port in Bander Abbas the submarines will be
required to pass through the narrow straits when leaving and
returning to port, greatly increasing the likelihood of
detection. If based outside the Gulf at Chah Bahar, they will
have to operate in the deep waters of the Northern Arabian Sea
and Indian Ocean where U.S. anti-submarine warfare
21Ibid., p. 44.
"
2Ahmed Hashim, p. 192.
"23Eisenstadt, p. 136.
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capabilities are enhanced. In the near-term the most effective
use of the submarines would appear to be for the clandestine
deployment of mines."' The Kilo-class submarine can deploy a
total of 36 mines.a
Iran's sea denial program has a clearly defensive aim. It
reflects the lessons Iran has learned from its war with Iraq
and from Iraq's defeat in Operation Desert Storm. Its primary
goal is to deny or delay hostile naval forces access to Gulf
waters. Considering Iran's strategic interest in continued
international access to the Gulf, it seems unlikely that Iran
would attempt to block the Straits of Hormuz unless confronted
by a crisis of "Desert Storm" proportions.
C. BALLISTIC MISSILES
The missile bombardment of Baghdad and Tehran in the
spring of 1988, known as the "war of the cities", was a
military and political defeat for Iran. While Iran managed to
fire a total of 61 SCUDs at Baghdad26 , it was on the
receiving end of 203 Iraqi SCUD variants (Al-Hussein and Al-
2
'Vice Admiral Douglas Katz, Commander NAVCENT, Dees
N~_& 17-23 January 94, p. 30.
2
'FoZ. a technical evaluation of the Kilo class
submarinte see John Jordan, "The 'Kilo' Class Submarine,"
JAD&ZLq Intelligience Review, September 1992, p. 427. Jordan
suggeasj that Russia also provided 1800 submarine compatible
mines, but I have not been able to confirm this fact.
2
-Iran fired a total of 77 SCUDs during the spring of
1988. 61 at Baghdad, nine at Mosul,'five at Kirkuk, one at
Tikrit and one at Kuwait. Cordesman, p. 367.
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Abbas)." Iran's inability to counter the Iraqi onslaught had
a demoralizing effect on its citizens. The psychological
effect of continuous strikes and fears of possible chemical
attacks drove Iranians into the countryside by the droves. By
late April 1988 millions of people had fled Tehran. 2" The
damage to Iran's war effort was tremendous.
The perception that Iran was at the mercy of an Iraq
commanding vast weapons stocks, unconstrained
internationally and with little or no compunction as
to humanitarian values or morality was surely
unnerving to citizenry and government alike. 29
Iran's inability to respond in kind caused the populace to
lose faith in the political leadership's conduct of the war
and probably contributed to Ayatollah Khomeini's decision to
accept the U.N. ceasefire resolution. Iran became determined
never to suffer this type of humiliation in the future.
Despite the spiral dynamics of the "war of the cities"
Iran's leaders emphasize the deterrent value of ballistic
missiles.
For us, missiles have a deterrent role.. .no war can be
stopped through missile attacks and the military
forces, particularly the infantry, decide the course
of war.. .but Iran must strengthen its missile forces
as quickly as possible, so that the very thought of an
"27Ibid., p. 366.
2 8Ibid., p. 367.
29Shahram Chubin, pp. 21-22.
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attack with missiles will be eliminated from our
neighbor's mind. 3"
Discussing Iran's retaliatory attacXs on Iraqi cities during
1988, Rafsanjani commented:
Iran does not wish to embark on such a course but that
it has to somehow dissuade the Iraqi Government from
attacking cities."
Iran's present ballistic missile program reflects its
concern about the growing regional ballistic missile threat
and the .necessity of maintaining a sufficient retaliatory
capability as a deterrent to future attacks. The survivability
and psychological shock value of Iraq's SCUD missiles during
Operation Desert Storm only served to reinforce Iran's belief
that missiles are essential.
We learned a great deal in the course of the
war.. .missiles are the most important weapons today
and we have solved the most important problems
regarding the missile industries, and now what
concerns us is what to produce, how many to
32produce...
3 0Tehran Television Service interview with Hashimi
Rafsanjani, 28 March 1988, FBIS-NES, 29 March 1988, pp. 56-
57.
3 1Interview with the Islamic Republic News Agency
(IRNA), Tehran, 29 March 1988, in FBIS-NE$, 30 March 1988,
p. 48.
3 2
"Preparing for Protection of Our National Interests,"
R, Tehran, 31 December 1990. Cited in Shahram Chubin,
pp. 22-23.
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In addition to their deterrent value there are specific
characteristics that make ballistic missiles especially
attractive. The comparative ease with which they may be
produced and operated, combined with a high rate of
survivability and success, is congruent with Iran's strategic
philosophy. The relatively high percentage of assured
penetration and long range make them acceptable substitutes
for deep strike aircraft, which require the advanced technical
support and expertise of a professional air force to operate."
Iran's ballistic missile force is built primarily around
the Soviet-designed SCUD. Iran is believed to possess between
250-300 missiles of the SCUD-B and SCUD-C variants. The
majority of these weapons are believed to have been purchased
from North Korea.
In addition to its foreign purchases Iran has actively
pursued an indigenous manufacturing capability. It locally
produces several artillery rocket systems. These are the
Oghab, Shahin-2, Naz'eat, Mushak-160 and the Iran-200. 35 Iran
"For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages
of ballistic missiles see Seth Carus, Ballistic Missiles In
The Third World: Threat and Response, (New York: Praeger,
1990), pp. 27-39.
"
34James Wyllie, "Iran - Quest for Security and
Influence," Jane's Intelligence Review, July 1993, p. 312,
Eisenstadt, p. 112, and The Military Balance 1993-1994,
(London: Brassey's Ltd., 1993), p. 115.
"3"The Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles," Arms
Control Today, April 1992, p. 29.
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is believed to be constructing a manufacturing facility for
SCUD-Cs.36
Of greatest concern to Iran's neighbors and Israel is the
Iran's imminent acquisition of the North Korean No-Dong 1
missile. The No-Dong 1, with a range of over 1000km would
theoretically allow strikes against Israel from western Iran.
The No-Dong 1 carries a 1760 pound conventional warhead and
could be armed with either chemical or nuclear warheads but is
not believed to be very accurate (estimated CEP: 2-4km).37 A
joint Iranian-North Korean effort to develop a more accurate
version of the No-Dong 1 is also believed to be underway."-
Unconfirmed reports suggest that Iran has purchased 150 No-
Dong Is and that delivery will occur in the near future
(Summer 1994).
Regional ballistic missile proliferation is one of the
most critical factors driving Iran's security dilemma. Israel,
Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, and possibly Iraq, have potent
ballistic missile capabilities which Iran cannot ignore.
Iran's accelerated acquisition of these weapons demonstrates
its desire to balance the growing ballistic missile and air
threat it believes it faces.
36Ahmed Hashim, p. 215.
"3?Eisenstadt, p. 114(n41) and Ahmed Hashim, p. 215.
"
3aShahram Chubin, p. 58.
"
39Douglas Jehl, "Iran Is Reported Acquiring Missiles,"
New York Times, 8 April 1993, p. A9.
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There seems to be three main goals for Iran's ballistic
missile program. The first goal is deterring any future Iraqi
missile attacks. Secondly, Iran hopes to deter an Israeli
preemptive strike against its military or economic
infrastructure, similar to the air strike which destroyed
Iraq's OSIRAK nuclear reactor in 1981. Finally, Iran hopes to
deter or, at the least, increase the cost of any offensive
operation the United States might attempt to undertake against
it.
D. CHEMICAL WEAPONS 40
For Iran the issue of chemical weapons is especially
sensitive. In much the same way as it sees itself as a victim
of ballistic missiles, Iran feels that it was unjustly
victimized by chemical attacks during its war with Iraq. Iran
and Iraq are both signatories to the Geneva Protocols of 1925
and the Biological Convention of 1972.41 Despite this fact
Iraq made extensive use of chemical weapons during the war.
Iran was caught off guard and scrambled to obtain chemical
protective gear for its troops and began to pursue the
acquisition of a retaliatory capability.
"°Iran's biological program is very primitive. Very
little information is available but Iran is believed to be
experimenting with anthrax and mycotoxins. Cordesman, p.
513, and Shahram Chubin, p. 49.
"4Cordesman, p. 506.
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Table 5.1: Regional Ballistic Missile Proliferation
State System Range km Payload kg Source
Iran SCUD-B,C 300/600 1000/700 N. Korea
No-Dong 1 1000 17601b N. Korea
Iraq Al-Hussein 600-650 135-250 Iraq42
Al-Abbas 900 500-1000
Saudi CSS-2 2500 2200 China
Arabia
Israel Jericho I 650 500 Israel/Fr
WI/Ill 1500/1300 650/700 Israel/Fr
Shavit 2500 750 Israel/Fr
India Prithi 250 500 India
Agni 2500 900 India
Pakistan Haft-1 80 500 Pak/Fr/Ch
M-1l 290 800 China
Sources: "The Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles," Arms
Control Today, April 1992, Anthony Cordesman, The Lessons of
Modern War, p. 504, and Shahram Chubin Iran's National
Security Policy, p. 58.
42Between 70 and 120 SCUDs are unaccounted for and
believed to be somewhere in Iraq. See Anthony Cordesman's
comments in "Symposium on Dual Containment," Mid E
Pi•y•, Vol. III, No. 1, 1994, p. 11.
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Iran's chemical warfare program is, in large part, the
result of the international community's refusal to condemn
Iraqi chemical attacks. Iran protested these offenses loudly
to the U.N. but was unsuccessful in its attempts to alienate
Iraq from the international community. Since the war Iran has
actively campaigned against the use of chemical weapons. It
was co-sponsor of a U.N. resolution calling for all member
nations to sign the Chemical Warfare Convention.4 3 In late
1993, Iran adamantly pointed out Iraqi chemical attacks
against Shi'a communities in the southern Iraq. U.N. teams
were dispatched to investigate these charges and despite some
evidence of their validity, no action was taken against
Baghdad. The international community has been content to turn
a blind eye to Iraq's chemical weapons use, thus solidifying
Iran's belief that it must acquire its own chemical stockpile.
Its belief in the deterrent value of a sizeable chemical
stockpile might have been enhanced by Iraq's obvious restraint
in the face of an overwhelming U.S. response had it chosen to
use chemi~cal weapons against coalition forces during Operation
Desert Storm.
Evidence of Iran's use of chemical weapons is extremely
scarce and ambiguous. Although it denies any use, "even as a
43 "Chemical Weapons in the Middle East," Arms Control
Today, October 1992, p. 44.
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means retaliation"44 , it appears that Iran used lethal
chemicals once or twice during the war. Some sources suggest
that the-weapons used on these occasions were captured Iraqi
artillery rounds. 45 Despite having amassed a significant
stockpile of chemical weapons by 1988, Iran did not employ
them, even to stop the Iraqi offensives that penetrated deep
into Iran that spring."' It is not clear whether Iran
restrained itself on moral grounds or whether it lacked the
ability to deliver the weapons effectively.
Iran is believed to have one chemical weapon production
facility capable of producing mustard, cyanide and phosgene
gas. 47 Former CIA director Robert Gates estimated the Iran's
stockpile of chemical weapons at approximately 2000 tons of
blister, .choking and blood agents. 4 8 Presently the means of
delivery are restricted to artillery shells and air-dropped
bombs. 49 It seems that Iran has not yet developed a chemical
warhead for its ballistic missiles. 50
"44From the speech of Ali Akbar Velayati, Foreign
Minister of Iran, to the Paris Conference on Chemical
Weapons, 7 January 89, quoted in Shahram Chubin, p. 25.
"45Ibid., pp. 508-509, and p. 513.
"46Iraqi forces conducting these offensive operations
between April and June of 1988 made extensive use of nerve
and mustard gas. Cordesman, p. 509.
47Arms Control Today, October 92, p. 44.
48Shahram Chubin, p. 49.
49Arfis Control Today, October 92, p. 44.
5 0Eisenstadt, p. 115.
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Despite its concerns about *the potential abuse of
mandatory inspections for political purposes, Iran signed the
Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty in 1993. Interestingly,
unlike Egypt and Syria, Iran did not set Israel's compliance
with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a pre-condition
of its own compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. 5 1
Iran's own terrible experience with chemical weapons certainly
provided enough incentive for its unconditional acceptance of
the treaty. Iran's public position opposing chemical weapons
seems contradictory to indications of continued production.
Recent events have further clouded the picture. There have
been numerous reports of attempts to acquire chemical weapons
precursors and manufacturing facilities. The most prominent
incident occurred in July-August 1993. A Chinese cargo ship
bound for Iran was suspected by the CIA of carrying chemical
weapons precursors. The ship was eventually inspected by Saudi
officials and declared free of any contra-band. 52
Chemical weapons present a moral dilemma for Iran. Iranian
officials routinely denounce chemical warfare as inhumane and
immoral:
It is not acceptable under any circumstances to harm
humanity by means of nuclear weapons or other means of
5 1Shahram Chubin, p. 48.
52
"China, Iran enjoy egg on U.S. face," I, 17
September 1993, p. 16.
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mass destruction, such as chemical weapons and such
likee. 3
At the same time, widespread proliferation of chemical weapons
and the unwillingness of the international community to
condemn nations which engage in chemical warfare limit Iran's
options. If a retaliatory chemical. warfare capability will
deter future chemical attacks against its citizens, Iran may
feel morally obligated to pursue such a capability.
Iran reserves the right.. .to get the technological
know-how to confront the chemical agents our enemies
mights use against us."4
Iran's intentions concerning its chemical weapons program
are vague. Obviously, Iraq is a major consideration. Although
its chemical warfare program has been set back by Operation
Desert Storm and U.N. inspections, there is some speculation
that Iraq retains a limited chemical capability. 5 There is
also the issue of its biological warfare program. According to
CIA Director James Woolsey "neither war nor inspections have
"
53Press conference with Hashemi Rafsanjani, 3 February
1993, quoted in Shahram Chubin, p. 47.
"Hussein Firuz-abadi, Chief of the Armed Forces
Command Headquarters, 14 March 1991, quoted in Shahram
Chubin, p. 47.
"
5Anthony Cordesman, quoted in "Symposium on Dual
Containment," Middle East Policy, Vol. III, No. 1, p.11.
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seriously degraded Iraq's biological warfare program". 56 In
the absence of a nuclear deterrent, chemical weapons offer a
poor but acceptable alternative. Iran may also believe that
chemically-armed ballistic missiles will serve as an elfective
interim deterrent to an Israeli nuclear strike while it
develops its own nuclear capability.
E. IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
No issue involving Iran has received more attention than
its alleged nuclear weapons program. Perhaps better than any
other issue, the course of its nuclear program serves to chart
the dramatic change in Iran's strategic philosophy. Iran's
renewed interest in nuclear power demonstrates the resurgent
importance of technology in Iran's strategic philosophy.
After the revolution Ayatollah Khomeini declared the atom to
be "the Devil's work" and Iran's nuclear program was
practically dismantled. By 1984, when Iraq had demonstrated
its propensity to use chemical weapons to blunt human-wave
assaults, Iran once again displayed interest in nuclear
technology.
Iran's nuclear program began during the 1970s under the
Shah. Shortly after India conducted its "peaceful" nuclear
test explosion in 1974, the Shah commented about the
possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons:
"
56Quoted in Shahram Chubin, p. 49.
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We don't want Iran to procure nuclear weapons just for
the sake of having them. But I tell you quite frankly
that Iran will have to acquire atomic bombs if every
upstart in the region gets them. 5s
Despite his declarations to the contrary, there is now little
doubt that the Shah was pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.
The Shah's nascent weapons program took the form of a secret
research program which was an offshoot of Iran's nuclear
energy program. This ambitious program aimed at the eventual
construction of 23 nuclear power stations prior to the turn of
the 21st century.5 8
Under the guise of its energy program Iran was pursuing a
"three-pronged" weapons program. The "prongs" of this
clandestine effort included nuclear weapon design research,
and research into the two methods of obtaining fissile
material (the extraction of plutonium from spent reactor cores
and the enrichment of uranium). The uranium enrichment
research was interesting in that it focused on the use of
special lasers vice energy consuming calutrons in the
enrichment process.s9
"
5 7Mohammed Reza Shah, quoted from interview with
Hussanein Heikal, Kayhan International, 4 September 1975, p.
4.
seLeonard Spector, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of




Beginning in 1984 and more significantly since the end of
the war, Iran has actively pursued the reconstruction and
enlargement of its pre-revolution nuclear infrastructure.
International assistance has been sought in the completion of
two 1300 megawatt reactors at Bushire, which had been eighty
percent completed by the German firm, Kraftwerk, prior to the
war." A new nuclear research center was opened in Isphahan
in 1984. Iran has sought to purchase nuclear technology from
as many as twenty countries." It has encouraged the return
of nuclear scientists and technicians who fled after the fall
of the Shah and has sought to hire nuclear specialists from
the states of the former Soviet Union. 62
Iran has had only limited success in these endeavors, due
mainly to U.S. pressure on potential suppliers. Iran has
obtained a small calutron (located at the Isphahan research
center) from China, 63 and a Chinese commitment to provide
three reactors - two 300 megawatt power generation reactors
(to be located at Darkhovin) and a 27 megawatt research
reactor (presently under construction at Isphahan). Russia has
"6°Spector, p. 204.
"6'Eisenstadt, p. 107.
62Zachary S. Davis and Warren H. Donnelly, "Iran's
Nuclear Activities and the Congressional Response,"
Congressional Research Service Issue Brief, 5 October 1992,
p. 4.
63There is some debate as to whether this particular
calutron is capable of producing sufficient weapons grade
material to produce a nuclear device. Davis, Donnelly and
Eisenstadt suggest that it is not.
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been contracted to construct two 440 megawatt reactors at
either Gorgan or Bushire." There is evidence that laser
enrichment research is once again underway in Tehran and
possibly at the Isphahan research center."s
The public stance of Iran's prominent leadership on the
issue of nuclear weapons has evolved over the last six years.
In 1988 Rafsanjani stated:
We should equip ourselves both in the offensive and
defensive use of chemical, bacteriological, and
radiological weapons."
By 1992 Rafsanjani was singing a different tune.
We seek nuclear technology for peaceful uses and
consider this path to be right for all countries which
have the potential to acquire it."'
"64Eisenstadt states that the Russian reactors are to be
built at Gorgan but Reza Amrollahi, Director of the Iranian
Atomic Energy Organization, was recently cited as having
said that the Russian plant would be built at Bushire. See
"Nuclear Plants Provide 20 Percent of Energy," FBIS-NES, 5
November 1993, p.57.
"6sEisenstadt, p. 106. For more on Laser research in
Iran see "Paper Details Work of Laser Research Center,"
F _IS , 9 April 1993, p. 43.
"66"Hashemi Rafsanjani Speaks on the Future of the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps," Tehran Domestic Service,
0935 GMT, 6 October 1988, FBIS-NES, 7 October 1988, p. 52.
6 7 IN, 12 February 1992, p. 55, Quoted in Ahmed
Hashim, p. 208.
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Even Iran's military leadership officially disavows any
aspirations for nuclear weapons.
Political logic, morality, our own culture, and above
all the situation in today's world does not allow us
to have such deadly weapons.. .political wisdom demands
us not to go for the weapons that could cause
devastation to humanity.6"
While Iran's official position is clear, some cryptic language
is evident in the articulation of Iran's stance on the
proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region.
We have supported, and will continue to do so, all
agency efforts in enhancing the effectiveness of its
safeguards regimes. We have pursued an open and
transparent policy in this respect, in line with which
we took the initiative to invite the agency to visit
the requested nuclear facilities in Iran and verify
their peaceful utilization.. .As long as Israel, with
the full support of the United States, continues to
refuse to respect the wishes of the international
community we fear the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
concept will remain a dormant issue in the region.69
Despite statements to the contrary, it would appear that the
primary purpose for Iran's pursuit of nuclear technology is
the eventual acquisition of the capability to produce a
nuclear weapon. Iran's argument that it needs nuclear
"68Mohsen Rezai, quoted in a Islamic Republic News
Agency report, 2027 GMT, 23 February 1994, FBIS-JPRS-TND-94-
007, 23 February 1994.
""Amrollahi Speaks on U.N. role, Nuclear Issues at
IAEA," Islamic Republic News Agency report, 0932 GMT, 28
September 1993, FBIS-JPRS-TND-93-034, 27 October 1993.
Emphasis added by author.
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technology to meet its growing energy needs is not convincing.
Iran has the second-largest reserve of natural gas in the
world."0 Natural gas is considered a much cheaper and safer
source of energy production. It is not easily exported and
thus is best utilized for domestic energy production." If
limited to energy uses, the inherent high cost and danger
associated with establishing a nuclear power infrastructure
does not seem logical. Based on Iran's precarious economic
situation it would seem that the development of its natural
gas resources vice the construction of nuclear infrastructure
would be the wisest course of action. It seems that energy
production is a secondary goal of Iran's nuclear program.
The paucity of discussion within Iran on the issue of
nuclear weapons hinders analysis of its beliefs and
motivations. As with its other strategic capabilities and in
keeping with Iran's self-image as a nation besieged,
deterrence seems to be a primary goal.
Can our air force. .. take on the Americans, or our navy
take on the American navy? If we.put all our country's
budget into such a war we would just have burned our
money. The way to go about dealing with such a threat




"Interview with Akbar Tokran, former Iranian Minister
of Defense, Financial Times, 8 February 1993, p. 4, quoted
in Eisenstadt, p. 103.
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Recent events have confirmed general beliefs concerning
the greater deterrent value of nuclear weapons. Pakistan's
nuclear capability is perhaps viewed in Iran as having been a
major deterrent of an impending Indian conventional attack
during the 1990 Kashmir crisis. While chemical weapons are
arguably a cheap alternative, Iraq's large chemical stockpile
did not deter U.S. military action in Operation Desert Storm.
Open speculation that the United States would not have engaged
Iraq if it had possessed nuclear weapons only serve to enhance
these beliefs. This speculation is given credence by the
apparent. reversal of the U.S. stance on North Korea's
possession of nuclear weapons. The message, although not
necessarily accurate, is clear: nuclear weapons bring greater
security.
There is also the matter of prestige and leverage. Nuclear
weapons symbolize modernization and technological progress.
They would represent a major success for a revolutionary
regime which has been beset by defeats. Possession of nuclear
weapons ushers a state into the elite club of power politics,
possibly providing leverage in negotiations over regional and
international issues. For Iran they may be seen as the key to
reduced isolation and a greater role in regional and
international affairs.
Iran's intentions are clear to a degree. It is clear that
Iran seeks to build a nuclear infrastructure which will
provide the technological and resource base for the eventual
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development of nuclear weapons. The extent to which Iran will
pursue the actual development of a nuclear device is unclear.
Iran is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) and enjoys excellent relations with the IAEA. As with
its quick acceptance of the Chemical Warfare Convention,
Iran's compliance with international standards suggests that
there is a moral dilemma involved.
Iran is a theocracy, a government of God. While its values
and beliefs are not necessarily congruent with western values
and beliefs, the legitimacy of the regime is based on its
moral foundation in Islam. Unlike Iraq, Iran is constrained by
its concepts of right and wrong. The proliferation of nuclear
weapons, combined with Iran's sense of vulnerability create a
dilemma which requires Iran to balance its moral obligation to
provide for the security of the Islamic state with the
immorality of weapons of mass destruction.
It would seem that Iran is attempting to balance its moral
and security dilemmas by achieving a threshold capability in
the development of weapons of mass destruction. Under IAEA
supervision Iran will be able to legally build and operate a
nuclear infrastructure that could eventually produce weapons-
grade fissile material. If it is able to obtain the necessary
weapons components, such as triggers and fuzing technology, it




VI. IMPACT AND U.S. POLICY OPTIONS
Estimation of threat has a profound influence on the
policy formulation process. Misperception of threat often
leads to policies that create a spiral dynamic between states.
On the other hand, policies which result from an
underestimation of threat could encourage an aggressor state
to engage in more egregious behavior. Undeniably, Iran has
engaged in egregious behavior at the very low end of the
spectrum of conflict. Yet, Iran 'has not demonstrated a
propensity to utilize its military capabilities for any
purpose other than self-defense.
While its revolutionary Islamic message contains what may
be characterized as expansionist themes, it is not an
"expansionist" state in the literal meaning of the word; it
does not seek the expansion of its territory. Contrary to most
alarmist accounts, Iran does not claim sovereignty over
Bahrain. *The issue of the three disputed islands, Abu Musa and
the Tunbs, pre-dates the Islamic regime and has been inflamed
more by post-Desert Storm Arab ambitions than by any
unilateral Iranian action.
As long as the United States continues to identify
stability of the Persian Gulf as a major national interest it
cannot ignore Iran. The present U.S. policy assumes that Iran
is perhaps more egregious and irredentist than it actually is.
Developing a more appropriate and hopefully more successful
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policy must begin with an accurate appraisal of the threat.
This .chapter will examine the impact of Iran's growing
strategic military capabilities on regional security and
future U.S. military operations. It will then examine the
policy of dual containment and its role in Iran's security
dilemma, followed by a discussion of possible policy options.
A. THE IRANIAN THREAT: WHAT'S REAL AND WHAT'S IMAGINED
For the hard-line anti-Iran camp every new AK-47 that Iran
acquires represents a clear and present danger to western
interests. Estimates about the extent, purpose, and potential
impact of Iran's military buildup have been grossly
exaggerated, especially concerning its conventional weapons
purchases.
Generally, Iran's efforts to reconstruct its conventional
forces represent an attempt to address legitimate and very
serious security concerns.
If Iran were our friend today, we would be saying:
"You guys had better arm yourselves. You're weak. You
don't have sufficient capability to defend yourselves
in the region against likely problems.'
Iran is a nation that was devastated by eight years of a
brutal war, fought without significant resupply of parts for
its western-made weapon systems, during which it lost 40 to 60
'Graham E. Fuller, quoted in "Symposium on Dual
Containment," Middle East Policy, Vol. III, No. 1, 1994, p. 9.
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percent of its inventory of weapons. Initial estimates of
Iran's annual defense expenditures that exceeded $2 billion
dollars have been revised downward to between $600-800
million. 2 Estimates of the percentage of GNP Iran devotes to
defense expenditures hover around eight percent. 3 Typical
percentages for the defense expenditures of Iran's neighbors
vary between 20 and 30 percent of GNP. 4
Iran's worsening economic situation will undoubtedly
require further reductions in defense spending. Iran has
fallen behind on the service of its short term national debt
of approximately $30 billion dollars.' While it has
successfully rescheduled this debt it appears that new credit
will be more difficult to find. If oil prices remain at
present levels for the foreseeable future, Iran will be unable
to maintain even its present level of defense spending.
The bulk of Iran's conventional weapons purchases, while
considered technologically advanced, are either Russian,
Chinese, or North Korean products of dubious quality. Iran
2Anthony Cordesman, quoted in "Symposium on Dual
Containment," p. 12.
3The Military Balance 1993-1994, p. 225. Anoushiravan
Ehteshami, "Iran's National Strategy," International Defense
Review, April 1994, p. 29.
4Saudi Arabia spent 32.5 percent of its GNP on defense in
1992. The Military Balance 1993-1994, (London: Brassey's Ltd.,
1993), p. 225.
5Shahram Chubin, "Iran's Strategic Aims and Constraints,"
Iran's Strateuic Intentions and Capabilities, ed., Patrick
Clawson, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1994),
p. 89.
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presently poses no serious threat of overland invasion to any
of its regional neighbors, even Iraq. Even if Iran achieved a
conventional capability equivalent to that of Iraq prior to
Operation Desert Storm, geography and logistic requirements
would limit its ability to project and sustain power in the
Arabian peninsula.
While Iran's conventional buildup is generally benign, its
effort to acquire a significant sea denial capability is a
more pressing concern, which justifies closer analysis of its
potential impact on U.S. interests. The expansion of Iran's
sea denial capabilities must be placed in proper perspective.
Open access to the Persian Gulf is vital to Iran's economic
and national security. The other states of the region all
enjoy alternate routes by which they may access international
trade. Saudi Arabia and the GCC states have access to Saudi
Arabia's Red Sea ports and the Indian Ocean through Oman.
Barring a crisis of "Desert Storm"-like proportions it is
unlikely that Iran would take any action that could lead to
the loss of international access to the Persian Gulf.
In the event of such a crisis Iran's employment of
advanced underwater mines would present a significant obstacle
to the penetration of the Persian Gulf by U.S. naval forces.
Its other sea denial capabilities would be less effective.
Iran's small force of technically limited anti-ship missile
systems would be susceptible to interdiction through air
strikes, anti-missile defense systems, and electronic
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countermeasures. Two or three Russia submarines, even if
manned by an experienced Russian crew, would have a very short
period of survivability when confronted by the United States'
advanced anti-submarine warfare forces. Only sophisticated
mines present a credible threat to U.S. naval forces and the
extent of their impact on a determined U.S. military operation
would be limited in scope and duration.
Nonetheless, these capabilities would restrict the
flexibility of U.S. military response. U.S. aircraft carriers
would likely operate from outside the Gulf. This would
complicate the employment of U.S. naval air power. Maritime
preposition shipping would be forced to off-load at ports
outside of the Gulf, further delaying the buildup of U.S.
forces. Beyond these minor inconveniences, the impact of
Iran's sea denial capabilities is overstated. At best Iran
could hope to slow the penetration of U.S. forces into the
Gulf.
Regarding Iran's growing arsenal of ballistic missiles and
its potential to arm them with chemical and nuclear warheads,
Western anxiety is much more justified. The mere presence of
these weapons exacerbates the insecurity of the Arab Gulf
states, adding fuel to the regional arms race and possibly
leading to other regional proliferation efforts.
The extended range of ballistid missiles greatly expands
the scope of regional security issues. In the past, Iranian
animosity towards Israel meant little more than venomous
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rhetoric and harassment of Israeli forces by Hezbollah
guerrillas in South Lebanon. The potential combination of the
No-Dong 1 and chemical or nuclear warheads elevates Iran's
potential threat to Israel from that of a minor nuisance to a
credible threat to national security.
The direct impact on the United States of Iranian WMD
proliferation is less clear. There is some evidence that U.S.
strategic superiority would serve to deter the use of such
weapons during a direct military conflict between Iran and the
U.S. military forces. Iraqi restraint during Operation Desert
Storm may be attributed to the deterrent effect of an
inevitably massive U.S. response to any Iraqi use of chemical
weapons. However, while Operation Desert Storm demonstrated
that mere possession of chemical weapons would not deter the
United States from engaging in military action, it is not
clear what the U.S. response would have been if Iraq had
possessed an operational nuclear capability. The greatest U.S.
concern about Iran's possession of WMDs is not their potential
use in a conventional military engagement but the possibility
of a terrorist "revenge" operation. The potential for a
nuclear or chemical weapon to be delivered by covert means
such as a tramp steamer or truck, with the associated
plausible deniability of its source, greatly complicates
issues of deterrence and response.
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B. POLICY OPTIONS: DUAL CONTAINMENT OR POSITIVE ENGAGEMENT?
Present U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf is known by the
term "dual containment". Originaliy enunciated by Martin
Indyk, the Special Assistant to the National Security Council
for Middle East Policy, dual containment seeks the continued
isolation of both Iraq and Iran as nations that "pursue
policies fundamentally hostile to American interests". 6
Specifically regarding Iran, Mr. Indyk has identified five
areas where Iran pursues policies counter to U.S. interests:
First of all, in its efforts to pursue the acquisition
of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction; second, in its efforts to acquire
offensive capabilities in the conventional area that
would threaten its neighbors; third, in its promotion
of terrorism and assassination on a world-wide scale;
fourth, in its efforts to oppose and undermine the
Arab-Israeli peace process...and finally its efforts
to exploit difficult situations which some of our
friends in the region face.'
The first two of the five points, Iran's conventional and
unconventional weapons programs, appear to be the real focus
of the strategy of dual containment. This policy emphasizes
the control of arms and technology transfers.
To counter Iran's quest for domination of the Persian
Gulf, we work closely with the friendly governments to
6Martin Indyk, quoted in "Symposium on Dual Containment," p.
2.
"7'Symposium on Dual Containment," p.5. Emphasis added by
author.
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prevent Iran from obtaining the imports needed for its
nuclear and chemical programs and we are very vigilant
about the transfer of missile and missile-related
systems... We are very much against the supply of
dual-use technology to Iran because of its apparent
intention to produce weapons of mass destruction.'
While aggressively pursuing the containment of Iran's
strategic military capabilities, dual containment attempts to
recognize Iran's legitimate security concerns. In his recent
article in Foreign Affairs, National Security Advisor Anthony
Lake notes that dual containment does not imply an arms
embargo against Iran:
This does not mean Washington intends to quarantine
Iran or deny it all military-related goods. This
administration tries to distinguish between defense
items that do not affect the regional security
environment and those items that have a offensive use
and could destabilize the area. 9
Since Iran is not under a military embargo and there are
no U.N. sanctions in place, the success of dual containment
openly depends on the cooperation of U.S. allies in the areas
of technology transfer and economic assistance to prevent
Iran's acquisition of threatening military capabilities. "The
'Ibid., p. 7.
9Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," Foreign
- , Vol. 72, No. 2, March/April 1994, p. 53.
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U.S. strategy depends heavily on active coordination and
consultations with friendly countries".1 0
Finally dual containment assumes that a "favorable
balance" in the Persian Gulf may be .sustained for "some time"
by relying on continued U.S. military presence and "a common
understanding and common agreement with our regional
friends" .11
By focusing on the issue of proliferation, dual
containment addresses the most critical issue of concern about
Iran's behavior. Unfortunately, the policy is flawed, both in
conception and application. In many ways this , 'icy serves to
perpetuate and exacerbate the spiral dynamics of Iran's
security dilemma. In its conception dual containment assumes
that Iran is an aggressor state, on par with Iraq, which is
pursuing the acquisition of strategic capabilities as a means
of achieving ultimate hegemony over the Persian Gulf. This
assumption tends to diminish the significance of Iran's
legitimate security concerns, and discounts Iran's xenophobic
security perspective. The inevitable, even if unintended,
comparison of Iran with Iraq convinces Iran of the United
States' hostile intent, leading it to believe that the
ultimate goal of U.S. policy is the destruction of its
10Ibid., p. 54.
"
1 Martin Indyk, Quoted in "Symposium on Dual Containment,"
p. 3.
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military and economic infrastructure as well as the overthrow
of the regime.
Dual containment seeks to counter not only nuclear
proliferation but also "destabilizing" conventional
proliferation. This is the other conceptual flaw in the
policy. In this regard the policy falls into the trap of
attempting to define the nature of weapon systems as either
offensive or defensive. Since there are very few, if any,
purely defensive weapon systems, Iran's acquisition of any
weapon system of even alleged offensive capability becomes a
threat which must be contained. The result is a nation denied
access to conventional means of defense. Predictably,
conventional military weakness enhances Iran's desire for
strategic capabilities.
Although conceptually flawed, dual containment could
conceivably achieve its goals if there were a consensus among
the major Western powers to apply the policy with conviction.
However, -there is no international consensus. In fact there
seems to be a consensus among U.S. allies that the present
U.S. policy is incorrect and inappropriate. Without the
support of Iran's European and Japanese trading partners the
policy of dual containment, as it applies to Iran, is dead in
the water.
The failure of the administration to create a consensus
agreement has produced a response completely opposite of that
which is desired. This policy not only fails to contain Iran
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but by attempting to increase its isolation, pushes it more
rapidly towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The
inherent gaps in the application of the policy allow Iran to
maintain access to international supplies of cash and
technology. Iran has had little trouble in circumventing
America's attempts to isolate it from both the credit and arms
markets.
Even with the support of U.S. allies there is no evidence
that Iran's proliferation would be "contained" by the present
policy. The effectiveness of International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) safeguards, the Chemical Warfare Convention
(CWC), and the Missile-Technology Control Regime is dubious.
North Korea, China, and Russia are Iran's major suppliers of
modern military technology. India and Pakistan are possible
sources of nuclear-related technology, and as non-signatories
neither are subject to the restrictions of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Despite the changes in the
international system, these states have not demonstrated a
particular willingness to conform to American wishes on issues
of foreign policy. Given Iran's access to hard currency and
the lack of control over technology transfers, the reality of
eventual Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons becomes simply
a matter of market economics and time. If the United States is
committed to preventing Iran's acquisition of WMDs, the
failure of present policy leaves open only the option of
preventive force.
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The final flaw in dual containment is the reliance on
continued U.S. presence to ensure stability in the Persian
Gulf. This assumes that the political status quo will remain
the same for "some time". It relies heavily on the goodwill
and political viability of the Gulf monarchs. There is little
evidence to support the assumption that either of these
conditions are ensured. In fact, there are indications that
the Gulf states are beginning to distance themselves from the
policy. The Secretary General of the GCC articulated the
position of the Arab Gulf states regarding this policy. "What
interests us is that this policy not-reflect on our situation,
and that our states not be affected by it." 12 Even if the
Arab Gulf states are willing to abide a high profile, long
term U.S. military presence there is some doubt as to the
ability of the United States to sustain it. Reductions in
defense budgets and manpower counsel against a policy that
ties up large numbers of U.S. troops and equipment for an
indefinite period.
At its present level U.S. military presence in the Gulf
creates a false balance of power, dependent on a continued
U.S. commitment. 13 The U.S. guarantee of security completely
inhibits any effort to establish a regional security forum
12 Ai-Haat, 17 October 1993, p. 5. Quoted in F. Gregory
Gause III, "The Illogic of Dual Containment," Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 72, No. 2, March/April 1994, p. 57.
"13Present U.S. force levels are actually, on average, quite
small. However, the U.S. now has a much greater "surge"
capability as compared to the pre-Gulf war period.
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that would address the security concerns of all the regional
states. It requires the smaller Gulf states to play regional
security roles that are inappropriate for their size and
means. This has led to a massive conventional arms buildup in
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, and to a
lesser degree in Bahrain. Combined with greater U.S. military
presence, the arming of the GCC states increases Iran's
perception of threat, in turn increasing its incentives for
WMD proliferation.
Since dual containment as a counter-proliferation policy
will not achieve the desired results and may in fact encourage
more dangerous behavior by Iran, how can the United States
prevent Iran from acquiring weapons of mass destruction? It
seems that barring comprehensive military action by the United
States the certainty of WMD proliferation is unavoidable as
long as a Iran believes that weapons of mass destruction will
enhance its security. A more effective policy would seek to
halt the spiral dynamics of the security dilemma by
implementing a strategy of positive engagement vice
containment.
Unlike dual containment the conceptual basis of this
policy is not a determination of Iran's predisposition towards
aggressive or benign behavior. The conceptual basis of
positive engagement focuses on efforts to convince Iran that
as long as it refrains from aggressive behavior and does not
threaten U.S. national interests, its national security is not
103
in doubt. Specifically, this policy would seek to convince
Iran that it neither needs to acquire nuclear weapons nor that
acquisition of nuclear weapons will enhance its security in
any way.
The cornerstones of positive engagement are the three
areas in which U.S. and Iranian national interests converge;
regional stability, reduced U.S. military presence, and
continued expansion of economic ties. The United States can
apply the policy unilaterally and without a direct dialogue
with Iran.
Implementation of the policy would begin with a unilateral
declaration in which U.S. interests and concerns are clearly
articulated in a very specific manner. Much like dual
containment, this policy would strongly emphasize those
issues in which Iran's future behavior could harm U.S.
interests. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
regional aggression, subversion of foreign states, and
terrorism would be clearly defined as unacceptable. The United
States must convince Iran that its response to violations in
these four areas would be swift, determined, and
comprehensive.14
Unlike dual containment this policy would recognize that
the long term solution for maintenance of regional stability
"'
4For a discusion of the importance of long term commitment
to mutual interests and reciprocity of behavior in the
development of cooperation see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of
Cooperation, (New York: Basic Books, 1984), pp. 124-141.
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lies not in an unending U.S. presence but in the creation of
a viable balance of power managed through a regional security
organization. While emphasizing the mutual interests of the
regional 'states and the United States in the achievement of a
diminished U.S. military presence, the United States must
reaffirm its commitment to the defense of its interests.
Regarding proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
Iran should be encouraged to continue cooperation with the
IAEA and the CWC. While pointing out the apparent illogic of
Iran's pursuit of nuclear energy, the United States should
concede that a state that is willing to abide by international
guidelines should not be barred from peaceful use of nuclear
technology. Iran must be reminded that the United States would
remain extremely vigilant concerning attempts to acquire non-
nuclear weapon components and that any attempt to assemble a
nuclear device would be strongly challenged. It must be made
absolutely clear to Iran, that any use of a nuclear weapon
would result in its complete annihilation. Finally, the United
States should take a stronger stand on the establishment of a
nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East. If the Arab-
Israeli peace accord reaches a successful conclusion with the
confrontation states, the United States should pressure Israel
to dismantle its nuclear arsenal and sign the NPT.
The final element of a policy of positive engagement would
be official encouragement of expanded economic ties with Iran.
This does not imply that the United States should prop up a
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failing regime with economic aid. It is simply a recognition
that attempts to block Iran's access to international markets
are a losing proposition which only increases Iran's
xenophobia and costs the U.S. economy millions of dollars a
year. The expansion of economic relations may not lead to the
establishment of diplomatic relations but it is in the mutual
interest of both Iran and the United States, and as such,
should be used to establish the foundation from which the
gradual normalization of relations might grow.
Although the policy of positive engagement assumes that
Iran is not inherently an aggressor state, the United States
cannot ignore the possibility of future Iranian aggression. It
would be a critical error to allow a policy of engagement to
become an obvious "tilt" towards Iran. A policy of engagement
with Iran combined with the continued containment of Iraq,
will eventually create a regional imbalance of power which
could be exploited by Iran.
Since maintaining a favorable balance of power in the Gulf
through Dual Containment is extremely costly in both economic
and political terms, the United States should consider a
strategy that seeks to re-establish a true balance of power in
the region. The challenge is to find a state capable of
balancing Iran. The prospects are dim. Over the long term, the
only regional state with the resouirces to balance Iran is
Iraq. Distasteful as it may seem, there may be no other long
term solution to the problem of Gulf security than the re-
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emergence of Iraq as a regional power. To this end the United
States must reconsider its policy of containing Iraq.
Continued economic sanctions and support for autonomous zones
may eventually lead to the permanent crippling of Iraq as a
sovereign state. Three small states filling the spot on the
map where Iraq used to be will only serve to further
complicate the security issues of the region. While engagement
may lead to a gradual rapprochement between Iran and the
United States, the re-establishment of a true regional balance
of power will provide the best guarantee of regional
stability.15
15For examples of early thinking along these lines see John
Arquilla, "Even Now, Hussein Serves a U.S. Purpose," Los Angeles
Times, 22 March 1992, and Israel Shahak, "How Israel's Strategy




Iran is a state with a xenophobic security perspective. It
sees itself as being historically isolated, and unjustly
denied its rightful role in the regional power structure.
However, Iran's xenophobia is as' much a result of its
historical experience over the last 2500 years as it is an
expression of its frustrated revolutionary aims. Injustice and
denied greatness are the predominant themes of Iran's history,
culture, and ideology. The combined effects of geographic
isolation, cultural and ideological cleavages, and a long
history of successive subjugation tp foreign conquerors have
contributed greatly to Iran's sensitivity to security issues.
Recent history has served to confirm and reinforce Iran's
sense of isolation and embattlement. The failure of the
international community to condemn Iraqi aggression, and use
of chemical warfare, is seen as evidence of an international
conspiracy to suppress and destroy Iran. This notion is
confirmed by the U.S. policy of dual containment which
implicitly suggests that Iran is an aggressor state, similar
to Iraq.
Further exacerbating Iran's xenophobia are its very real
national security problems. Iraq, even under embargo, retains
sufficient military strength to threaten Iran. Afghanistan and
the Central Asian republics continue to be embroiled in
internal conflicts that threaten to spill across borders and
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sensitize Iran's heterogeneous population to volatile ethnic
cleavages. The Arab Gulf states, with the backing of the
United States, are arming themselves to the teeth. The
enlarged U.S. military presence threatens to permanently
exclude Iran from any security role in the region. Finally,
Israel has identified Iran as the greatest threat to the
Jewish state.
Iran's response to these threats has been conditioned by
the lessons of the Iran-Iraq war and the Gulf war. Iran has
rejected its earlier strategic philosophy which relied on
Islamic vervor and revolutionary zeal in favor of a philosophy
that emphasizes the importance of technology and a trained,
professional military force. Special emphasis has been placed
on the acquisition of strategic capabilities which are
believed to be sufficient to deter perceived threats.
Underwater mines, submarines and anti-ship missiles
reflect the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf for Iran.
Iraq's successful use of mines against the coalition forces
reinforced Iran's belief in the usefulness of these weapons
systems against an overwhelming conventional naval force.
Ballistic missiles are seen as a necessary deterrent to future
Iraqi aggression and possibly as a deterrent against an
Israeli preemptive strike. Ballistic missiles are simple to
operate, survivable and serve as an adequate substitute for
deep strike aircraft. Chemical weapons are also seen as an
evil necessity that may deter the future use of such weapons
109
against Iran. Finally, Iran's growing nuclear infrastructure
indicates that Iran is pursuing, over the long term, a nuclear
weapons capability. The primary objective of its nuclear
program would also seem to be deterrence. With a nuclear
capability Iran would hope to deter any punitive military
actions by the United States, or Israel. Additionally, nuclear
weapons would be seen as a major accomplishment for a
revolutionary regime that has been beset with defeat.
Ironically, these attempts to deter future aggression have
only served to heighten suspicion concerning Iran's
intentions. Iran's revolutionary political ideology is an
anathema to the rulers of the Arab Gulf states and secular
regimes in Egypt and Algeria. The goals that have inspired
Iran's support of Islamic fundamerntalist organizations and
attempts to subvert other regional governments are assumed to
be the motivating factors of its military buildup. States
suspicious of Iran have reacted to its rearming with military
buildups of their own, contributing to the spiral dynamics of
the security dilemma.
Interestingly, there is little evidence that Iran is
actually pursuing a hegemonic role in the Persian Gulf. It
would be more accurate to state that Iran is pursuing a role
within the regional political, security, and economic
structures that is commensurate with its size, resources and
population. Iran has no expansionist aspirations and does not
lay claim to territory outside its borders. Estimates of the
110
scope and purpose of its conventional military buildup have
been greatly exaggerated. Even its growing strategic
capabilities reflect more of a concern for deterrence than any
inherently aggressive tendencies.
The U.S. policy of dual containment assumes the opposite;
that Iran is an inherently aggressive, expansionist state that
must be contained. As a result, Iran's belief that the United
States seeks its destruction is confirmed, providing more
incentive for Iran to acquire a deterrent capability. Beyond
its conceptual flaws, the policy of dual containment is
geopolitically naive. Its success relies on strong support
from U.S. allies, but this support has failed to materialize.
It assumes that the political and military status quo of the
Persian Gulf will remain fundamentally unchanged for the
foreseeable future and that any minor changes will be easily
managed from Washington. However, there is no evidence that
the status quo of such a volatile region will remain constant
and there is certainly no reason to believe that the United
States is capable of influencing political change in the
region. Finally, it depends on a long term, high profile, U.S.
military presence in the region, despite reduced defense
budgets and manpower reductions.
This policy clearly states that the United States views
Iran as a state that pursues policies which are hostile to
U.S. interests - i.e. Iran is an enemy. At the same time, the
weaknesses of the policy have allowed Iran to maintain access
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to the very sources of financial, technical, and military
support that the policy seeks to deny. The net result of dual
containment is the creation of strong incentives for Iran to
acquire WMDs as quickly as possible.
If the major goal of U.S. policy is long term stability in
the Persian Gulf, then an alternate strategy must be
considered. This policy should focus on efforts to convince
Iran that its security will not be enhanced by the acquisition
of weapons of mass destruction. The critical objective of the
policy would be the creation of a viable regional security
organization in which all states of the region would play an
appropriate role. The United States would seek to gradually
reduce its security role in the region. Iran would not be
denied the means to provide for its defense in a reasonable
conventional manner. Expansion of non-military economic ties
with Iran would be encouraged.
At the same time, the U.S. position on the issues of
proliferation, subversion, terrorism, and military aggression
would be made absolutely clear. The U.S. would continue to
conduct bilateral relations with the states of the region and
remain openly committed to the stability of the region.
Such a policy would counter the spiral dynamics of the
Iran's security dilemma in a positive manner. By focusing on
the mutual U.S.-Iranian interests of regional security,
reduced U.S. military commitment, and the expansion of
economic ties, the United States could unilaterally lay the
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foundation for long term regional stability and rapprochement.
Finally, the United States must not rely solely on a
policy of engagement with Iran to produce long term stability
in the region. This issue must be addressed by the re-
establishment of a regional balance of power. Since Iraq is
the only regional state capable of balancing Iranian power,
the United States should re-evaluate its policy which supports
the continued containment and dismemberment of Iraq.
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